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1. Introduction 
1.1. Summary 
This dissertation contributes new evidence to two areas of research. The first part of the work 
aims at analyzing persistence in growth rates of operating performance as an important factor 
for firm valuations. The second part investigates the tremendous success of a lottery bond, the 
British Premium Bond. 
The first two essays, presented in chapters 2 and 3, perform in-depth analyses on both the 
predictive power as well as the predictability of persistence in growth rates. In this context, 
persistence derives from the length and the relative frequency of so called runs. A positive run 
is registered if a firm produces above-median growth rates for a number of consecutive years. 
A negative run consists of a series of consecutive below-median growth rates, respectively.  
Runs and therefore persistence in growth rates are strongly linked with the valuation of a firm. 
Many investors, analysts and valuation professionals extrapolate past growth rates to make 
their forecasts. The reason for this is the wide-spread sentiment among market participants 
that there is a considerable degree of consistency in a firm’s growth rates. This relation 
between persistence in growth rates and firm valuations leads to the two research questions 
addressed in the first part of the dissertation: (1) Do investors overestimate the predictive 
power of a high persistence in sales growth rates? (2) Is it possible to predict a high future 
persistence in growth rates based on a set of firm-specific financial indicators? These research 
questions are related to the literature on earnings behavior and investor expectations. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1987, 1990) analyze returns of stocks that have experienced either extreme 
capital gains or extreme losses. They argue that investors overreact to past firm performance 
and conclude that this is the main reason why simple value strategies based on valuation 
ratios beat growth strategies. In this context, Lakonishok et al. (1994) show that glamour 
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stocks with consistently high past growth rates in operating performance are rewarded with 
rich valuations. In the same way, value stocks are punished for previous disappointments after 
several years of consistently poor growth rates. They conclude that market participants had 
too high expectations about the future performance of glamour stocks. Confirming this 
finding, La Porta (1996) and La Porta et al. (1997) show that investors tend to extrapolate past 
growth too far into the future. As a result, stock market returns of value stocks tend to 
outperform glamour stocks over the long-term (e.g., Fama and French (1988)). Although 
investors are often tempted to believe in a high consistency of firm growth rates, research 
shows that empirically this is not the case. For instance, Little (1962) and Little and Rayner 
(1966) find that in the UK corporate annual earnings numbers essentially follow random 
processes. A short time later, Lintner and Glauber (1967) analyze US data and confirm that 
changes in earnings over time appear to be randomly distributed. The closest related study to 
the essays presented in this dissertation is the US-based cross-sectional study by Chan et al. 
(2003).  They caution against extrapolating past income growth rates into the future, because 
there is no persistence beyond chance. However, they do report that there is some persistence 
in sales growth rates.  
Chapter 2 takes up this finding. It follows the question: what are the implications of an 
increased persistence in sales growth on future income growth rates? In particular, it 
investigates the hypothesis that investors overestimate the translation of an increased 
persistence in sales growth into consistently high income growth rates. The initial sample 
comprises data of more than 54,000 firms from 77 countries and over a sample period of 28 
years. For the analysis, a new single measure of persistence in growth, called weighted 
frequencies-score (wf-score), is developed. It is based on a nonparametric test for serial 
correlation called “run-test” used by Chan et al. (2003). The new measure allows meaningful 
comparisons across heterogeneous sets of firms. It also enables to compare persistence in 
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growth of the three examined performance indicators sales, operating income and net income. 
The results are as follows. Investors apparently strongly reward runs of above-median growth 
rates and thus a high persistence in sales growth. It is also shown that an increased persistence 
in sales growth is a global phenomenon. This supports the finding of Chan et al. (2003). The 
results furthermore reveal that the higher the persistence in sales growth, the more persistence 
is lost in the translation into income growth rates. This leads to the hypothesis that firms may 
trade persistence in income growth for a high persistence in sales growth. In a final test, it is 
shown that the loss of persistence in sales growth is correlated with consistently high growth 
rates in operating expenses. In total, the study cautions not to overestimate a high persistence 
in sales growth as a strong predictor of future profit growth rates.  
Chapter 3 analyzes persistence in growth rates from a different perspective. In the previous 
chapter, the definition of persistence derives on an aggregate firm level. This means, 
persistence is detected if a group of firms has more runs of a certain length than would occur 
randomly. The goal is to analyze what past persistence tells about future persistence. In 
chapter 3, the focus is on individual firms and the predictability of specific runs which consist 
of combinations of above-median and below-median growth rates. Since firm valuations 
strongly respond to multiannual runs, it is worth to analyze their predictability and thus 
investigate the factors indicating or causing future runs in growth. The analysis aims to 
identify variables that indicate whether a firm is more likely to be particularly successful or 
unsuccessful within the next couple of years. The research methodology is based on binary 
response models. Both logit regressions and a multiple discriminate analysis are employed to 
distinguish between two distinct groups of firms. The first group has a positive run, consisting 
of a series of above-median growth rates after a given point in time. The second group of 
firms has a negative run, consisting of below-median growth rates, respectively. The 
prediction period covers six years. To endogenously identify the parsimonious indicator-
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specific set of economically and empirically meaningful variables, stepwise regression is 
used. In-sample and out-of-sample classification tests are conducted to evaluate the predictive 
power of the forecast models. The results show that based on a set of widely-used financial 
variables, predicting positive and negative runs is possible. The accuracy of the prediction 
depends on the length of the investment period. The most salient prediction variable turns out 
to be the dividend to price ratio. 
In chapter 4, representing the second part of the dissertation, a very successful British lottery 
bond is in the focus of interest, the Premium Bond. After being launched by the British 
Exchequer in November 1956, customers had almost 27 million holdings in Premium Bonds 
totalling about £43 billion by the end of 2011. Although monthly return is solely based on a 
lottery and therefore uncertain, this financial product is very popular. The study aims to 
explain what makes the Premium Bond and generally lottery-linked deposit accounts 
successful. The sample consists of a unique hand-collected set of data provided by the issuer. 
In total, it covers a period of fifty-four years. The first part of the study considers the expected 
utility theory (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964). To evaluate the relevance of an investor’s individual 
risk tolerance, the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) coefficients are calculated at which a saver is indifferent between the Premium Bond 
and a risk-free investment. The second part of the study searches for factors influencing net 
sales. To detect relationships, Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) are employed. Potential 
explanations based on cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; 
Pfiffelmann, 2008) and prize skewness are analysed in detail (Guillén and Tschoegl, 2002; 
Golec and Tamarkin, 1998; Garrett and Sobel, 1999; Bhattacharya and Garrett, 2008). 
Finally, autoregressive models are constructed in order to establish a formal relationship 
between Premium Bond net sales and a variety of potential influential factors. The results 
show that CARA and CRRA risk coefficients as well as cumulative prospect theory have no 
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or only limited statistical influence on net sales. However, prize skewness, the number of 
jackpots and the maximum holding amount are important factors driving net sales. 
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1.2. Overview of essays 
Papers included in the present dissertation: 
• Does the persistence in sales growth rates have predictive power? 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
ACATIS Value Prize 2013, Submitted to European Financial Management 
• Predicting above-median and below-median growth rates 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
Submitted to Review of Managerial Science 
• Why are British Premium Bonds so successful? The effect of saving with a thrill 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
Submitted to Journal of Empirical Finance 
Papers not included in the present dissertation: 
• The level and persistence of growth rates: International evidence 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
Working paper, presented at Campus for Finance - Research Conference 2013, WHU 
Vallendar, January 16/17, 2013 
• Perpetuity, bankruptcy, and corporate valuation: The global evidence  
[Ewigkeit, Insolvenz und Unternehmensbewertung: Globale Evidenz]  
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
CORPORATE FINANCE biz 2 (4) (2011), 252–257.  
• Happy savers, happy issuer: the UK lottery bond, 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
Revue Bancaire et Financière/Bank- en Financiewezen, (6-7) (2008), 408–414.  
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2. Does the persistence in sales growth rates have predictive power? 
 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
 
ACATIS Value Prize 2013 
 
Presented at Campus for Finance - Research Conference 2013, WHU Vallendar, January 
16-17, 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003) report that there is some persistence in sales growth 
rates in the United States. First, we establish that this also holds around the world. Second, we 
corroborate that investors strongly reward high persistence in sales growth. This suggests that 
investors tend to overestimate this indicator as a predictor of future profit growth rates. Third, 
we find evidence that the higher the persistence in sales growth, the more the persistence gets 
lost in the translation into income growth. Our study issues a warning not to overestimate the 
predictive power of a high persistence in sales growth. 
 
 
 
Keywords: sales growth rates, persistence, prediction 
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2.1. Introduction 
Stocks that have had a long record of superior past growth rates tend to receive rich 
valuations. However, most of them are not able to live up to these high expectations, and their 
valuations return to the mean. A prominent interpretation of this effect is offered by both De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Lakonishok et al. (1994). They argue that investor 
overreaction to past firm performance is the main reason why simple value strategies based on 
valuation ratios (such as book-to-market) surpass growth strategies. Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
argue that when forecasting future earnings, investors extrapolate past growth too far into the 
future.1 Contradicting this strong belief among investors research shows that there is no 
persistence in long-term earnings growth beyond chance. In their seminal United States (US) 
based study, Chan et al. (2003) (CKL) reaffirm this notion and forcefully caution against 
extrapolating past success in income growth into the future. However, they do find some 
persistence in sales growth. In the following, we call this phenomenon an “increased” or 
“high” persistence. In other words, more firms than expected under the hypothesis of 
independence are able to maintain above-median sales growth rates for many consecutive 
years. This finding prompts the question, what are the implications on growth rates of 
operating and net income? In the present study, we expand the work of CKL and perform a 
profound analysis on this topic. We investigate the hypothesis that investors overestimate the 
predictive power of an increased persistence in sales growth. More specifically, these 
investors overestimate its translation into consistently high income growth rates. To our 
knowledge, this article is the first to present empirical evidence on the persistence in sales 
growth around the world and on its relationship to persistence in income growth. Our results 
                                            
1
 In sports, a similar phenomenon is known as the belief in “hot hands” (Camerer, 1989). Hendricks et al. (1993) 
analyze the hot hands effect in mutual fund performance. 
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should be important to investors as well as analysts in order to avoid being deceived by an 
alleged useful predictor.  
Our sample comprises data from more than 54,000 firms from 77 countries and over a sample 
period of 28 years. To allow sound comparisons across heterogeneous sets of firms and 
performance indicators, we develop an innovative measure called the weighted frequencies-
score. The indicator is based on the run-test, a nonparametric test for serial correlation, 
applied by CKL. The weighted frequencies-score further expands upon the original run-test 
by generating a single measure of persistence in growth. Using this method, we analyze 
consistency in growth of sales, operating income, and net income. In doing so, we split our 
sample according to country and industry affiliation, firm size, market valuation, and 
leverage. In a final analysis, we investigate the hypothesis that firms try to “buy” a high 
persistence in sales growth at the cost of increasing operating expenses.  
Our main findings are as follows. Indicating potential overestimation, we observe that 
investors strongly reward runs and thus a high persistence in sales growth. In line with the 
existing US evidence, we find that an increased persistence in sales growth is a global 
phenomenon. Our results reveal that the higher the persistence in sales growth, the more 
persistence is lost in the translation into income growth rates. Supporting our hypothesis that 
firms may trade persistence in income growth for a high persistence in sales growth, we find 
that the loss of persistence in sales growth is strongly correlated with a high persistence in 
operating expense growth rates. In total, our study issues a warning not to overestimate a high 
persistence in sales growth as a strong predictor of future profit growth rates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses our sample and the methodology. Section 2.4 examines how investors 
evaluate past sales growth in their company valuations. Section 2.5 studies the translation of 
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persistence in sales growth across a number of subsets of firms. Section 2.6 investigates 
operating expenses in this context. Section 2.7 concludes the report. 
2.2. Literature review 
The literature regarding expectations about future growth rates is related to research on why 
value stocks outperform growth stocks. One possible explanation for this anomaly is investor 
overreaction. In their research, De Bondt and Thaler (1987, 1990) analyze returns of stocks 
that have experienced either extreme capital gains or extreme losses. Referring to Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973), who report that people have a tendency to overweight salient information 
(such as recent news), they argue that this trend might be explained by biased expectations of 
the future. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Chopra et al. (1992) conduct further analyses that 
corroborate these findings. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that investors tend to extrapolate 
past growth rates too far into the future. A paper by Barberis et al. (1998) formalizes the same 
general idea. La Porta (1996) conducts further analyses and argues that analysts and investors 
rely too heavily on past growth in their forecasts and valuations. La Porta et al. (1997) 
examine the hypothesis that the superior return to value stocks is the result of expectational 
errors made by investors. They find that investors may incorrectly assume that there is a 
significant degree of consistency in growth, so they extrapolate glamour stocks’ past superior 
growth rates (and value stocks’ past disappointing growth rates) too far into the future.  
Our study is also related to the rather slim literature on the behavior of earnings growth. Early 
evidence for the United Kingdom (UK) is provided by Little (1962) and Little and Rayner 
(1966). They find that corporate annual earnings numbers essentially follow random 
processes and therefore challenge the assumption that a firm's past growth performance is a 
good predictor of its future growth. In line with these conclusions, Lintner and Glauber (1967) 
and Brealey (1983) provide evidence for the US and confirm that changes in earnings over 
time appear to be randomly distributed. Based on these findings, many further studies 
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investigate earnings predictability by applying time-series models (e.g., Beaver, 1970; Ball 
and Watts, 1972; Albrecht et al., 1977). However, these studies only focus on short-term 
forecasting.  
One of the few recent studies on persistence in operating performance growth rates is the 
seminal paper by CKL. They convincingly show that there is no persistence in net income 
growth rates. Despite this fact, they do identify some persistence in sales growth rates. They 
suppose that a shrinking profit margin is the reason why growth in sales shows more 
persistence than growth in profits, but they do not investigate this relationship in detail. 
2.3. Data and methodology 
2.3.1. Data 
Our study is based on a large international sample. The data used are obtained from Thomson 
Datastream and Worldscope. The sample period runs from 1980 to 2008, as no firm 
accounting data are available before 1980. The start dates vary across countries and firms 
because of data availability. First, we select all active and inactive equities recorded in the 
database. Following CKL, we do not exclude any kind of firms.2 We then control for multiple 
collections of the same company, data errors, and missing data. Time-series of inactive firms 
are included in the dataset during their time of existence. Our initial sample comprises a total 
of 54,176 firms in 77 countries. At the end of each calendar year, we collect net sales or 
revenues, operating income, and net income before extraordinary items/preferred dividends 
for each firm in local currencies.3  
At the end of each calendar year, we calculate growth in operating performance as follows, 
                                            
2
 We do not include American depositary receipts (ADRs) and closed-end funds. CKL do not describe their 
procedure in this context. 
3
 Worldscope items WC01001, WC01250, and WC01551.  
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 ,−1, = 	
, − 	
,−11 + ,	
,−1                     (2.1) 
  
where g is the growth rate of firm i over the period of time t-1 to the sample selection year t. 
PI denotes the operating performance indicator. Following CKL, we assume that the 
dividends are reinvested, taking into account different dividend payout policies. We measure 
growth on a per-share basis and assume that an investor would typically buy and hold shares 
over a specific period. The number of shares outstanding is adjusted to reflect stock splits and 
dividends.  
In cases where earnings in the base year are negative, growth rates cannot be calculated, so 
the number of eligible growth rates would be reduced. We therefore also apply the 
substitution method described in CKL (see page 653). To ensure a robust data basis for 
comparisons, we drop all countries with an insufficient number of eligible sales growth rates 
over the entire sample period. Our final sample encompasses 53,435 firms in 48 countries, of 
which 32,300 exist at the end of our sample period in 2008. In total, the sample includes 
531,091 firm-years, with 31.4% of these attributed to US firms. Firms in Japan and the UK 
account for 12.9% and 7.3% of all firm-year observations, respectively. The remaining 45 
countries typically account for less than five percent of the total observations. 
2.3.2. Methodology 
Our approach is based on the run-test design applied by CKL. First, the median of all eligible 
growth rates is calculated at every calendar year’s end. We then determine how many 
consecutive years a company is able to beat the median. This row is called the run. Finally, 
we calculate the percentage of firms with runs in relation to all the firms that survive for the 
same period of time. Extending the analysis of CKL, our goal is to measure the degree of 
persistence in growth. We therefore refer to percentages that are higher than we expect under 
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the hypothesis of independence as an “increased” persistence in growth. To ensure best 
comparability across sets of firms, we also need to consider some further issues.  
2.3.2.1. Nonsurviving firms  
When comparing sets of firms, nonsurviving firms may bias our conclusions. The fewer firms 
survive, the higher the percentage of firms with runs. For instance, consider two groups A and 
B with 100 eligible firms (e.g. two countries) in the sample selection year. In Group A, three 
firms have a run for five consecutive years, and all firms survive for the same period of time. 
We report that 3% of all valid firms have a five-year run. In Group B, three firms have a run 
for five consecutive years, but now only 90 firms survive for the same period of time. 
Therefore, we report that 3.33% of all valid firms have a five-year run. It would appear that 
persistence in growth is higher in Group B than in Group A. In fact, some firms with a 
particularly poor performance lead to this erroneous conclusion.  
2.3.2.2. Comparing run lengths 
The run-test produces a combination of percentages, which is difficult to compare with others. 
Simply adding up the obtained numbers would neglect the fact that a very long run is much 
more difficult to achieve than a short run.  
2.3.2.3. Discrepancy between the groups  
Our approach requires two groups of firms. The first group is tested for runs, and the second 
one provides the basis for median calculation. Typically, the second group would comprise all 
firms within a country. At sample selection, these groups usually are identical. Without 
filtering, over time, Group 1 shrinks due to nonsurviving firms. In contrast, Group 2 gains 
size as each year new firms are added because of new foundations or simply due to 
improvements in data availability. The longer the test period, the larger the discrepancy. This 
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finding leads to the problem that it becomes impossible to state precise expected probabilities 
of beating the median for a number of years.  
2.3.2.4. The weighted frequencies-score  
To control for these issues, we develop a modified run-test design that we call the “weighted 
frequencies-score” (wf-score). Limiting our analysis to a rolling five-year horizon reduces the 
problem of low data availability over long periods of time. At the end of every calendar year, 
we select all firms that survive for the next five years. We then calculate the median growth 
rate of this set of firms for each of the next five years after the sample selection. The medians 
are determined separately for each country in order to avoid biased comparisons due to 
generally different levels of growth rates. This approach also eliminates the issue of varying 
inflation rates and accounting conventions across countries. Based on these medians, we 
determine the percentage of firms with above-median growth rates for a number of 
consecutive years with respect to the total number of firms in the group and can now 
accurately determine the percentages expected under the hypothesis of independence. By 
definition, 50% of all firms have an above-median growth rate in the sample selection year, 
25% are expected to have a run for two years, and so on. To factor in the length of the run, we 
multiply the actual frequency of firms with the inverse of the expected frequency. For 
instance, if the expected frequency of a four-year run is 6.25%, the weighting factor would be 
16. In the final step, we sum up the weighted frequencies to obtain a single, comparable 
measure of persistence in growth rates. The resulting formula is as follows, 
 	
,, =  	
,,,	
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                   (2.2) 
 
where wf is the weighted frequencies-score, t specifies the sample selection year, c is the 
group of firms that survive for five years after sample selection, and PI denotes the 
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performance indicator. The run length in years is denoted by l; n is the number of firms with a 
run length l, and N is the total number of firms in group c. If the distribution of above-median 
growth rates is totally random, the wf-score will be 0.5×2+0.25×4+0.125×8+ 
0.0625×16+0.0313×32=5.00. Values above 5.00 suggest persistence beyond pure chance 
(“increased persistence”) and quantify the scale. Values below 5.00 suggest the opposite. The 
theoretically highest possible wf-score is 31, which would suggest that all firms with above-
median growth rates in the first year had a run for five consecutive years. The lowest possible 
value is 1, indicating that no firm has a run for more than one year.  
The focus of our study is to relate persistence in sales growth to other performance indicators. 
As a measure we use wf-delta which is the difference between the wf-score of income growth 
and the wf-score of sales growth. Negative values suggest that there is more persistence in 
sales growth than persistence in income growth. Positive values indicate the opposite. 
2.4. Investor appreciation of persistence in sales growth 
We begin our study by examining how market valuations are affected by high persistence in 
growth, especially sales growth. At every calendar year’s end, we determine for each firm the 
length of the current run in both sales growth and net income growth. If a firm has a run, a 
figure between one (year) and five (years) is assigned. If a firm does not beat the median 
growth rate, a zero is assigned. We measure the valuation of a company based on its book-to-
market ratio (Datastream item MTBV). Table 2.1 shows the results across all firms and the 
entire sample period. Panel A analyzes the median book-to-market ratio of firms with runs in 
sales growth. Panel B performs the same analysis with net income growth.  
The results clearly indicate that firm valuations become richer with increasing run length. In 
Panel C, we assume that a firm enjoys a run in both performance indicators at the same time. 
The ratios suggest that investors not only reward past growth of the bottom line but also of the 
top line. We next try to isolate how investors appreciate sole persistence in sales growth. 
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Panel D reports the median book-to-market ratios assuming that a firm has a run in sales 
growth but no above-median net income growth rate in the current year. Valuations continue 
to increase with the run length. Panel E tightens the analysis. Firms now have a run in sales 
growth but no above-median growth in the current and the past year. As is intuitively 
expected, the overall valuation level is slightly lower than in Panel D but still increases with 
the length of the sales run. The results also apply to the final ten-year period from 1998 to 
2008. 
These findings suggest that investors give weight to persistence in past sales growth. The 
return of an investment, however, primarily depends on net income. If an increased 
persistence in sales growth does not translate into an increased persistence in income growth, 
investors are at risk of overestimating an impressive track record of past sales growth rates. 
2.5. Relationship between persistence in sales growth and persistence in income growth 
We commence with an analysis across the entire sample and sample period. Table 2.2 reports 
wf-scores measuring the persistence in growth of sales, operating income, and net income.  
Consistent with the US results by CKL, we confirm that there is an increased persistence in 
sales growth. The wf-score of 7.42 surpasses the expected 5.00 under the hypothesis of 
independence. However, as CKL argue, this persistence vanishes as we get closer to the 
bottom line. The wf-scores of operating income and net income are only 4.95 and 4.51, 
respectively. In fact, the probability to achieve a run is slightly lower than we would expect 
under the hypothesis of independence. To ensure that our results are significantly different 
from the expected frequencies, we perform chi-square tests to determine the equality of the 
distributions. We reject the null hypothesis of independence for growth in sales and net 
income at the 1% level. The persistence of operating income is not significantly different 
from pure chance. These first results suggest that in general, an increased persistence in sales 
growth does not translate into persistent high income growth rates. 
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To exclude the possibility that sales growth actually has become a more accurate predictor 
over the past decades, we calculate the wf-score for each sample selection year beginning 
with 1981. The last full five-year period starts in 2004. Table 2.3 presents the wf-scores for 
every performance indicator over the time periods from 1981 to 2004, 1981 to 1988, 1989 to 
1996, and 1997 to 2004.  
The results suggest that within 28 years, persistence in sales growth has further increased. In 
2004, the wf-score amounts to 8.06. Persistence in net income growth, however, does not 
follow this trend. It remains relatively stable with a slightly decreasing tendency. In 2004, the 
wf-score amounts to 4.80. Panel D reports wf-deltas of operating income and sales (OI-S) as 
well as net income and sales (NI-S). These findings suggest that the persistence of growth 
diverges over time. The wf-delta between net income and sales increases from -1.92 (1981 to 
1988) to -2.56 (1989 to 1996) and finally to -3.31 (1997 to 2004). The same applies to 
operating income and sales. The results indicate that although persistence in sales growth 
constantly increases, it is still a weak predictor for persistence in income growth. One possible 
explanation for this trend is that firms manage their sales growth rates at the cost of income 
growth. 
2.5.1. Analyzing subsets of firms  
We hypothesize that even a high persistence in sales growth would provide little information 
about the corresponding persistence in income growth. Subsets of firms will help us to test 
this hypothesis.  
2.5.1.1. Subset 1: Divided by country 
Given the variety of country-specific factors such as the legal system and the extent of 
investor protection (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002; 
Brockman and Chung, 2003; Beck et al., 2005), it seems likely that persistence is not exactly 
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equal anywhere around the world. Table 2.4 reports the wf-scores for each country in our 
sample over the entire sample period. We sort the countries in descending order by their wf-
score in sales. As expected, there is an increased persistence in sales growth in almost every 
country. Mexico, Poland, and France are ranked highest with wf-scores of 8.62, 7.98, and 
7.90. In contrast, Turkey, Denmark, and Venezuela only reach scores of 5.84, 5.70, and 3.77. 
In line with our hypothesis, there seems to be no clear-cut correlation between persistence in 
sales growth and persistence in income growth. To quantify the link, in Panel D, we calculate 
the wf-deltas of operating income and sales (OI-S) as well as net income and sales (NI-S). 
The results indicate that the wf-deltas tend to rise as persistence in sales growth increases. The 
countries ranked 1 to 15 have an average wf-delta score of -3.10 compared to persistence in 
net income. The countries ranked 16 to 33 average -2.59, and those ranked 34 to 48 only 
average -2.13. We find the same pattern when we compare sales and operating income. 
Apparently, the translation into net income growth becomes weaker as persistence in sales 
growth increases. 
2.5.1.2. Subset 2: Divided by industry  
As industries differ in many aspects, such as their sensitivity to business cycles, intensity of 
competition, and firm financial structure (MacKay and Phillips, 2005), persistence in growth 
is worth analyzing. The analysis is similar to the previous one, but now we classify firms by 
their industry affiliations instead of their country affiliations. The median growth rates are still 
calculated with respect to the individual countries. For industry classifications, we obtain 
four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes from Worldscope. The industry 
classification follows Fama and French (1997) distinguishing between 49 industry categories. 
Firms that do not fit into one of them are labeled as “unclassified.” Table 2.5 presents these 
results. Again, the list is sorted in descending order by the wf-score in sales.  
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We find considerable variation across industries. The “Personal Services” (11.98), “Retail” 
(11.30), and “Healthcare” (10.53) industries are ranked the highest. Consistent with the results 
of the previous section, we again find that the higher the persistence in sales growth, the less 
it translates into persistence of income growth. The industries ranked 1 to 15 exhibit a wf-
delta (weighted mean) with respect to net income of -4.22. In contrast, the industries ranked 
16 to 34 and 35 to 50 only amount to -2.37 and -1.77, respectively. The correlation becomes 
particularly obvious when considering the top three industries in Panel A. For instance, the 
“Retail” industry reaches a wf-delta score (NI-S) of -6.14. As a robustness test, we redo the 
analysis (results not reported) and calculate the median growth rates using industry categories 
instead of countries. The conclusions are the same. 
2.5.1.3. Subset 3: Divided by firm size  
Since industries are strongly distinguished from each other in terms of average firm size, we 
explore how firms of different sizes translate persistence in growth. It is well known that firm 
size is related to the firm's profitability, productivity, and survival (e.g., Zarowin, 1989; 
Zarowin, 1990; Beck et al., 2008). We calculate the wf-scores and wf-deltas for large, mid-
capitalization, and small firms over the entire sample period. Large firms are ranked in the top 
two deciles of market capitalization (in US dollars) as of the end of the sample selection year, 
while small firms fall into the bottom two deciles. Mid-capitalization firms cover all the 
remaining companies. Size decile breakpoints are computed separately from the entire 
universe of firms domiciled in the respective country. Panel A in Table 2.6 summarizes the 
results.  
We find that persistence increases with firm size. Large firms have a wf-score (weighted 
mean) in sales of 9.71, while mid-capitalization firms have a score of 7.42; small firms exhibit 
only an average score of 4.36. These findings once more support our hypothesis. The higher 
the persistence in sales growth, the less it translates into persistence of income growth. 
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According to Table 2.6, large firms have a wf-delta of -4.32 (OI-S) and -4.84 (NI-S). In 
contrast, the corresponding scores of small firms are positive and average 0.50 (OI-S) and 
0.06 (NI-S). In this case, persistence in operating income growth slightly exceeds that in sales 
growth. By computing the size classification each year, the group of large firms includes more 
and more past winners. As a check for robustness, we perform the same analysis (results not 
reported) with fixed size classifications based on the first available firm year. Our conclusions 
are still the same. 
2.5.1.4. Subset 4: Divided by firm valuation  
The widespread overestimation of persistence in growth among investors particularly 
manifests in the existence of value and glamour stocks. Considering the existing evidence 
(Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta et al., 1997) and our findings so far, we expect that 
glamour stocks would exhibit a relatively high persistence in sales growth, which potentially 
attracts investors. The translation into consistently high income growth rates, however, is 
probably weak as research shows that returns of glamour stocks underperform those of value 
stocks (e.g., Basu, 1977; Jaffe et al., 1989; Chan et al., 1991). In contrast, value stocks may 
have a relatively low persistence in sales growth but a rather good translation into income 
growth. 
At the end of every calendar year, we split all firms into three distinct groups. Glamour firms 
are ranked in the bottom three deciles by their book-to-market ratio. The group of value firms 
comprises firms that are ranked in the top three deciles. The remaining firms are labeled as 
moderate valuation firms. The decile breakpoints are computed separately for each country to 
take into account international differences in market valuations. Panel B of Table 2.6 presents 
the respective wf-scores and wf-deltas. In line with our expectations, the results confirm that 
the growth rates of glamour firms are more persistent than those of value firms. However, as 
is observed in the previous subsets of firms, this persistence has a considerably worse 
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translation. The wf-score (weighted mean) of 10.01 for sales translates into 5.84 for net 
income, which equals a difference of -4.17. Value firms have a wf-score of 5.18 for sales and 
3.53 for net income, which equals a wf-delta of only -1.65.  
2.5.1.5. Subset 5: Divided by leverage 
The last subset of firms we analyze focuses on the capital structure. According to the pecking 
order model of financing decisions (Myers, 1984), firms first fund projects out of retained 
earnings. Since profitable firms generate cash internally, in theory, more profitable firms are 
supposed to be less leveraged (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and French, 
2002). We therefore expect that less-leveraged firms generally would have an increased 
persistence in sales growth. As a proxy for the debt level of a firm, we use the “debt-to-total-
assets ratio” (Remmers et al., 1974) obtained from Worldscope (item WC08236).4 Following 
Fama and French (2002), we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) because 
financial intermediaries seem incomparable with other firms in terms of leverage. We also 
exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) because their capital structure may be influenced 
by regulation. At the end of every calendar year, we assign each firm to one of three groups. 
Low leverage firms include firms in the bottom two deciles by their debt-to-total-assets ratios. 
Median leverage firms comprise stocks ranked in the third through the seventh deciles, and 
high leverage firms cover firms ranked in the top two deciles. Leverage strongly varies across 
industries, so decile breakpoints are based on the universe of all firms in one particular 
industry. This approach additionally ensures that each set of firms include companies from all 
industries. The median growth rates are still calculated on a country basis. Results are 
presented in Panel C of Table 2.6 and reveal that persistence of sales growth indeed increases 
with decreasing leverage. Low leverage firms have a wf-score (weighted mean) in sales of 
9.30 across the entire sample period. The corresponding scores of median and high leverage 
                                            
4
 To control for outliers, we trim the data at the 99th percentile. 
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firms amount to 7.78 and 5.43, respectively. Analyzing the wf-deltas once more corroborates 
our previous conclusions. 
2.5.2. Robustness test: Firms with a very high persistence in sales growth 
In this section, we test for the robustness of our previous results by using as general of an 
approach as possible. In Panel A of Table 2.7, we construct two strikingly different sets of 
firms. The first group (Group A1) encompasses only firms with at least one five-year run in 
sales growth within their time of survival. The second group (Group A2) contains all the 
remaining firms. These firms do not have a single run in sales growth for more than four years 
at any given time. 
As expected, due to the rigorous selection criteria, the persistence in sales growth of Group 
A1 is the highest observed in this study. The wf-score of sales amounts to 18.53. Despite this 
fact, the wf-scores of operating income and net income are only 7.35 and 6.36, respectively. 
This means that the conversion from persistence in sales growth into persistence in income 
growth is also the weakest in this study. The wf-deltas amount to -11.18 (OI-S) and -12.17 
(NI-S). As expected, the translation is very different when analyzing the results of Group A2. 
Here, persistence in income growth even exceeds the very low persistence in sales growth 
(wf-score: 2.68). The wf-delta of operating income and sales is 1.25. With respect to net 
income and sales, it is 1.05. Obviously, there is a fair amount of firms with long runs in 
income growth but with shorter or even no runs in sales growth. In Panel B of Table 2.7, we 
relax the criteria and compare firms with at least one run for four years (Group B1) to firms 
without a single run for more than three years at any time (Group B2). The results are 
consistent with those in Panel A. As expected, the wf-scores and wf-deltas of Group B1 are 
now generally smaller than those of Group A1. 
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2.6. Relationship between operating expenses and persistence in sales growth 
There are a number of conceivable explanations for why persistence in sales growth vanishes 
on the way to the bottom line. CKL presume that a shrinking profit margin is the reason why 
growth in sales shows more persistence than growth in profits. Aghion and Stein (2008) argue 
that firms have to decide whether to focus their efforts either on increasing sales growth or on 
improving profit margins. Since managerial time and other resources are limited, firms face a 
strategic tradeoff between these objectives and therefore are confronted with essentially a 
multitasking problem (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Another reason may be that 
managers know the investors' preferences and actively cater to them. For example, Hong et al. 
(2003, 2007) examine analyst reports on Amazon.com over the period from 1997 to 2002 and 
illustrate that analysts initially almost exclusively focused on its long-run revenue potential, 
while profit margins were virtually neglected. 
Our previous findings give reason to believe that managers may trade income growth for 
momentum in sales growth because they assume that the stock market focuses on growth in 
sales rather than profit margins. In a last step, we investigate the hypothesis that a high 
persistence in sales growth is largely consumed by high operating expense growth rates. This 
process eventually leads to a slightly increased persistence in income growth at best. We 
focus on the two major items of operating expenses: “cost of goods sold” (CGS) and “selling, 
general, and administrative expenses” (SGAE).5 Due to low data availability for all countries 
except the US, we do not analyze research and development expenses. Table 2.8 lists all 
subsets of firms previously studied along with the respective wf-deltas based on operating 
income and sales. The list is sorted from the largest to the smallest loss of persistence in sales. 
For each subset of firms, we calculate the wf-scores for CGS and SGAE. This approach is the 
same as the one used for sales, operating income, and net income.  
                                            
5
 Worldscope items WC01051 and WC01101.  
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Our results clearly indicate a strong correlation. The group of firms with at least one five-year 
run in sales growth has the highest wf-delta amounting to -11.18 (OI-S). Interestingly, this 
group also has the highest persistence in growth rates of CGS (14.82) and SGAE (13.09). To 
establish a quantitative relationship for all subsets of firms, we calculate Pearson correlation 
coefficients. Based on the wf-deltas and the wf-scores of CGS, we obtain a correlation 
coefficient of -99%. The respective result based on the wf-scores of SGAE amounts to -95%. 
Both correlations are significant at the 1% level. Added together, the results from Table 2.8 
suggest two conclusions. First, the higher the loss of persistence in sales growth, the higher 
the persistence in operating expenses. Second, firms with a low persistence in sales growth 
tend to enjoy a better-than-expected persistence in operating income growth, since their 
growth rates in operating expenses are generally lower. 
2.7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we shed further light on the persistence of growth rates in operating 
performance as an overestimated predictor for long-term future growth rates. In a first step, 
we establish that investors do pay a great deal of attention to past consistency in sales growth 
rates in their company valuations. We therefore focus on the question of how the frequently 
observed increased persistence in sales growth translates into persistence in income growth. 
For this purpose, we require an indicator that allows us to consistently quantify persistence in 
growth rates and to perform meaningful comparisons. We therefore adopt the run-test 
approach applied by Chan et al. (2003) and develop a measure called the weighted 
frequencies-score. It analyzes above-median annual growth rates in the operating performance 
of firms that survive for at least five years and additionally factors in how long a firm 
outperforms the market. Using this method, we calculate persistence in growth rates for a 
variety of subsets of firms.  
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Our results expand the US evidence reported by Chan et al. (2003) and confirm that around 
the world, sales growth usually has an increased persistence. We also show that this 
persistence varies remarkably depending on factors like country or industry affiliation, firm 
size, and market valuation. Our results, however, also provide evidence that the higher the 
persistence in sales growth, the more persistence gets lost after the translation into income 
growth. We hypothesize that many firms place great emphasis on a high persistence in sales 
growth rates and try to “buy” this success. We also examine how the loss of persistence in 
sales growth is related to persistence in expense growth and find a strong correlation 
supporting our assumption. Taken together, our study issues a warning to investors and 
analysts not to overestimate long-term future profit growth, even if a firm has a remarkably 
high persistence in sales growth.  
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Table 2.1: Market valuation of persistence in sales growth and net income growth. 
This table analyzes how investors reward persistence in sales growth in their firm valuations. The table reports median book-
to-market ratios (BTMV) and available firm-years (N) dependent on the current run length in sales growth and net income 
growth. Statistics are provided for all firms and the entire sample period from 1980 to 2008. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Persistence in growth across the entire sample. 
This table analyzes persistence in growth across the entire sample of firms. To factor in the length of the run, the actual 
frequencies of firms with runs are multiplied with weighting factors (WFA) which are the inverse of the expected 
frequencies. The wf-score is the sum of the weighted frequencies. A wf-score of 5.00 indicates that persistence in growth is 
randomly distributed. Values above 5.00 indicate and quantify an increased persistence in growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
No run 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Panel A: Run in sales growth
BTMV 0.719 0.641 0.602 0.562 0.556 0.526
N 119,129 121,133 70,850 42,912 27,047 15,862
Panel B: Run in net income growth
BTMV 0.709 0.637 0.588 0.538 0.515 0.463
N 122,802 123,025 59,934 28,140 13,227 5,655
Panel C: Run in sales growth and net income growth
BTMV 0.735 0.613 0.541 0.474 0.433 0.364
N 72,495 73,628 26,777 10,365 4,261 1,691
Panel D: Run in sales growth (no run in net income growth in t)
BTMV 0.735 0.690 0.649 0.599 0.581 0.543
N 72,495 46,400 43,019 31,725 22,261 13,887
Panel E: Run in sales growth (no run in net income growth in t and t-1)
BTMV 0.741 0.690 0.654 0.606 0.592 0.552
N 31,160 46,333 29,944 27,131 20,481 13,179
1998-2008 0.781 0.719 0.667 0.613 0.617 0.578
Run length
Run length
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years wf-score
Expected frequency 50.0% 25.0% 12.5% 6.3% 3.1%
Weighting factor (WFA) 2 4 8 16 32
Panel A: Sales
Valid firm-years 265,312 265,312 265,312 265,312 265,312
Firm-years above median 132,655 75,841 45,240 28,292 18,312
Percent above median 50.0% 28.6% 17.1% 10.7% 6.9%
Weighted frequencies (Percent*WFA) 1.00 1.14 1.36 1.71 2.21 7.42
Panel B: Operating income
Valid firm-years 258,993 258,993 258,993 258,993 258,993
Firm-years above median 129,498 65,124 31,896 15,852 7,932
Percent above median 50.0% 25.1% 12.3% 6.1% 3.1%
Weighted frequencies (Percent*WFA) 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.98 4.95
Panel C: Net income
Valid firm-years 261,919 261,919 261,919 261,919 261,919
Firm-years above median 130,960 63,084 29,413 13,769 6,598
Percent above median 50.0% 24.1% 11.2% 5.3% 2.5%
Weighted frequencies (Percent*WFA) 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.84 0.81 4.51
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Table 2.3: Persistence in growth across the sample period. 
This table analyzes persistence in growth across the sample period. A wf-score of 5.00 indicates that persistence in growth is 
randomly distributed. Values above 5.00 indicate and quantify an increased persistence in growth. N denotes the number of 
available firm-years. Wf-delta is the difference between the wf-scores of operating income and sales (OI-S) as well as net 
income and sales (NI-S). 
 
  
Sample 
period wf-score N wf-score N wf-score N OI-S NI-S
1981 to 2004 7.42 265,312 4.95 258,993 4.51 261,919 -2.47 -2.91
1981 to 1988 6.83 34,339 4.72 32,077 4.91 32,306 -2.11 -1.92
1989 to 1996 7.41 79,767 5.11 75,711 4.85 77,083 -2.30 -2.56
1997 to 2004 7.56 151,206 4.92 151,205 4.25 152,530 -2.65 -3.31
Panel DPanel A Panel B Panel C
Sales (S) Operating income (OI) Net income (NI) wf-delta
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Table 2.4: Subset 1: Divided by country.  
This table analyzes persistence in growth for each country in our sample. The countries are sorted by the wf-score in sales in 
descending order. A wf-score of 5.00 indicates that persistence in growth is randomly distributed. Values above 5.00 indicate 
and quantify an increased persistence in growth. N denotes the number of available firm-years. At the bottom of the table, 
weighted means for the wf-scores are reported. Wf-delta is the difference between the wf-scores of operating income and 
sales (OI-S) as well as net income and sales (NI-S). 
  
 
Country Rank wf-score N wf-score N wf-score N OI-S NI-S
Mexico 1 8.62 1,209 5.81 1,195 3.43 1,142 -2.81 -5.18
Poland 2 7.98 671 3.78 653 3.71 653 -4.20 -4.27
France 3 7.90 9,698 4.53 9,059 4.72 9,255 -3.37 -3.18
United States 4 7.85 81,882 5.38 80,307 4.72 79,715 -2.47 -3.13
Chile 5 7.83 1,405 4.70 1,474 4.14 1,476 -3.13 -3.69
Japan 6 7.64 44,229 4.69 43,057 4.32 43,384 -2.95 -3.32
Italy 7 7.64 3,396 4.35 3,239 4.28 3,319 -3.29 -3.35
Hungary 8 7.62 220 3.95 210 4.22 220 -3.67 -3.40
Hong Kong 9 7.59 6,020 4.91 5,749 4.35 6,082 -2.68 -3.23
United Kingdom 10 7.55 18,907 6.14 18,709 5.21 19,087 -1.40 -2.34
Germany 11 7.43 9,828 4.17 8,483 4.25 9,280 -3.26 -3.18
Brazil 12 7.37 2,180 4.53 2,039 3.72 2,008 -2.84 -3.65
Switzerland 13 7.35 3,422 4.64 3,327 5.30 3,409 -2.71 -2.05
India 14 7.32 2,998 4.77 2,912 5.03 2,951 -2.54 -2.29
Colombia 15 7.32 328 5.57 319 4.54 327 -1.74 -2.78
Greece 16 7.21 2,253 4.63 2,242 5.02 2,253 -2.57 -2.18
Philippines 17 7.17 1,416 4.67 1,519 4.34 1,612 -2.50 -2.82
South Africa 18 7.15 2,828 4.85 2,859 4.78 2,965 -2.30 -2.37
China 19 7.15 6,827 5.15 6,670 5.45 6,859 -1.99 -1.70
Spain 20 7.01 2,430 4.71 2,196 5.65 2,248 -2.30 -1.37
Sweden 21 7.00 3,204 5.08 2,932 4.20 2,931 -1.92 -2.79
Singapore 22 6.98 3,642 4.16 3,513 4.09 3,675 -2.82 -2.89
Taiwan 23 6.96 5,478 4.32 5,213 4.05 5,234 -2.63 -2.91
Indonesia 24 6.93 2,401 4.47 2,373 3.56 2,398 -2.46 -3.36
Canada 25 6.91 7,947 4.84 8,626 3.97 8,622 -2.07 -2.94
South Korea 26 6.87 5,906 3.88 5,833 3.67 5,806 -2.99 -3.20
Russian Fed. 27 6.81 233 2.60 179 4.00 188 -4.20 -2.81
Ireland 28 6.80 833 5.66 901 5.03 897 -1.15 -1.77
Norway 29 6.73 1,921 4.15 1,818 3.49 1,763 -2.58 -3.24
Peru 30 6.69 548 4.49 509 4.73 523 -2.19 -1.95
Australia 31 6.65 5,040 4.90 6,200 4.12 6,380 -1.75 -2.53
Finland 32 6.63 2,113 4.43 1,859 3.92 1,796 -2.20 -2.71
Thailand 33 6.59 3,529 4.85 3,509 4.54 3,540 -1.74 -2.05
Luxembourg 34 6.59 266 3.87 253 3.74 259 -2.72 -2.85
Argentina 35 6.56 640 4.08 576 3.51 591 -2.49 -3.06
Netherlands 36 6.53 2,561 5.47 2,510 5.39 2,510 -1.06 -1.14
Belgium 37 6.46 2,241 4.14 1,855 4.19 1,971 -2.32 -2.27
Kuwait 38 6.43 51 2.94 51 3.53 51 -3.49 -2.90
Malaysia 39 6.30 6,019 3.97 5,802 3.81 6,064 -2.33 -2.49
Israel 40 6.28 601 4.62 577 3.97 595 -1.66 -2.31
New Zealand 41 6.17 758 5.09 740 4.43 768 -1.09 -1.74
Austria 42 6.09 1,180 4.13 1,114 3.72 1,180 -1.96 -2.38
Portugal 43 6.06 808 4.12 795 4.67 804 -1.95 -1.39
Pakistan 44 6.00 701 4.62 694 4.41 686 -1.38 -1.59
Czech Republic 45 5.98 191 3.54 178 4.15 192 -2.44 -1.83
Turkey 46 5.84 1,354 4.21 1,356 3.50 1,350 -1.64 -2.34
Denmark 47 5.70 2,781 4.04 2,609 3.56 2,690 -1.66 -2.14
Venezuela 48 3.77 218 2.96 200 3.08 210 -0.81 -0.69
All countries 7.42 265,312 4.95 258,993 4.51 261,919 -2.47 -2.91
Countries ranked 1 to 15 7.72 186,393 5.12 180,732 4.62 182,308 -2.60 -3.10
Countries ranked 16 to 33 6.92 58,549 4.65 58,951 4.33 59,690 -2.27 -2.59
Countries ranked 34 to 48 6.18 20,370 4.29 19,310 4.06 19,921 -1.89 -2.13
Panel A Panel B Panel D
Sales wf-delta
Panel C
Operating income Net income
41 
 
Table 2.5: Subset 2: Divided by industry. 
This table analyzes persistence in growth for each industry category in our sample. The industry definitions follow the 
method of Fama and French (1997). The industries are sorted by the wf-score in sales in descending order. Wf-scores above 
5.00 indicate and quantify an increased persistence in growth. N denotes the number of available firm-years. At the bottom of 
the table, weighted means for the wf-scores are reported. Wf-delta is the difference between the wf-scores of operating 
income and sales (OI-S) as well as net income and sales (NI-S). 
  
Industry Rank wf-score N wf-score N wf-score N OI-S NI-S
Personal services 1 11.98 1,750 7.36 1,690 6.12 1,701 -4.61 -5.85
Retail 2 11.30 12,480 5.71 12,091 5.16 12,039 -5.59 -6.14
Health care 3 10.53 1,715 6.19 1,711 5.18 1,693 -4.34 -5.35
Medical equipment 4 9.65 3,426 6.63 3,426 5.77 3,398 -3.03 -3.88
Communication 5 9.65 5,018 5.36 4,842 4.39 4,820 -4.28 -5.26
Candy & soda 6 9.56 1,480 4.84 1,439 4.49 1,436 -4.72 -5.07
Computer software 7 9.34 9,301 6.60 8,886 5.44 8,943 -2.74 -3.91
Restaraunts, hotels, motels 8 9.33 4,978 5.42 4,829 4.87 4,810 -3.91 -4.46
Insurance 9 9.08 6,439 4.95 6,139 4.96 6,273 -4.14 -4.12
Automobiles and trucks 10 8.98 6,258 4.55 6,123 4.72 6,058 -4.43 -4.27
Computer hardware 11 8.67 3,020 4.74 2,919 4.39 2,916 -3.93 -4.29
Business services 12 8.46 12,498 5.94 12,224 5.44 12,249 -2.52 -3.02
Transportation 13 8.28 7,818 4.17 7,316 3.98 7,387 -4.11 -4.30
Pharmaceutical products 14 8.23 6,066 5.52 6,364 4.95 6,383 -2.71 -3.28
Almost nothing 15 7.76 795 5.53 812 4.48 813 -2.23 -3.28
Wholesale 16 7.74 12,203 4.67 11,725 4.42 11,797 -3.07 -3.32
Rubber and plastic products 17 7.56 2,107 4.87 2,072 4.76 2,065 -2.69 -2.79
Tobacco products 18 7.42 482 8.06 472 7.17 481 0.63 -0.25
Trading 19 7.25 11,226 4.74 10,584 4.32 11,534 -2.51 -2.92
Consumer goods 20 7.15 5,119 4.69 5,043 4.29 5,002 -2.46 -2.85
Measuring and control equipment 21 6.98 3,100 5.44 3,059 5.02 3,042 -1.54 -1.96
Electronic equipment 22 6.92 10,585 5.04 10,139 4.69 10,123 -1.88 -2.23
Apparel 23 6.91 2,868 4.48 2,834 3.87 2,806 -2.43 -3.04
Banking 24 6.87 20,213 5.40 19,636 4.56 19,969 -1.47 -2.31
Construction 25 6.86 9,069 5.75 8,614 6.00 8,816 -1.11 -0.86
Utilities 26 6.80 8,068 3.35 7,824 3.07 7,881 -3.45 -3.73
Entertainment 27 6.80 2,779 4.64 2,773 4.00 2,797 -2.15 -2.80
Unclassified 28 6.76 7,699 5.44 7,649 4.65 7,790 -1.32 -2.11
Machinery 29 6.65 10,515 5.11 10,230 4.85 10,305 -1.54 -1.79
Recreation 30 6.62 2,305 4.13 2,244 3.96 2,254 -2.50 -2.67
Fabricated products 31 6.61 1,033 4.40 990 3.97 988 -2.21 -2.64
Electrical equipment 32 6.52 4,040 4.77 3,938 4.29 3,967 -1.75 -2.23
Food products 33 6.47 6,918 3.88 6,757 3.89 6,777 -2.58 -2.58
Steel works etc 34 6.46 6,495 4.51 6,159 3.99 6,156 -1.95 -2.47
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 35 6.44 563 6.59 528 5.09 536 0.15 -1.35
Chemicals 36 6.37 8,520 3.90 8,371 3.84 8,357 -2.46 -2.53
Petroleum and natural gas 37 6.29 6,003 4.66 6,184 3.97 6,157 -1.63 -2.32
Non-metallic and industrial metal mining 38 6.25 1,916 5.19 2,464 4.48 2,529 -1.06 -1.77
Construction materials 39 6.24 9,184 4.32 9,029 4.02 9,018 -1.92 -2.22
Shipping containers 40 6.04 1,168 3.46 1,149 3.34 1,147 -2.58 -2.70
Agriculture 41 5.67 1,921 3.70 1,886 3.40 1,864 -1.97 -2.27
Printing and publishing 42 5.65 2,600 5.13 2,546 4.37 2,535 -0.52 -1.27
Business supplies 43 5.62 4,333 3.74 4,212 3.52 4,121 -1.88 -2.10
Beer & liquor 44 5.52 2,024 4.57 1,953 3.84 1,978 -0.95 -1.68
Aircraft 45 5.40 1,222 5.33 1,188 4.75 1,180 -0.07 -0.66
Coal 46 5.33 570 3.96 620 4.37 614 -1.37 -0.96
Real estate 47 5.02 10,028 4.62 8,870 4.26 9,957 -0.39 -0.75
Defense 48 4.76 335 3.23 291 3.14 296 -1.53 -1.62
Precious metals 49 4.50 1,227 3.65 2,402 3.06 2,422 -0.85 -1.44
Textiles 50 3.71 3,832 3.21 3,747 2.90 3,739 -0.51 -0.81
All industries 7.42 265,312 4.95 258,993 4.51 261,919 -2.47 -2.91
Industries ranked 1 to 16 9.15 95,245 5.43 92,536 4.92 92,716 -3.72 -4.22
Industries ranked 17 to 34 6.84 114,621 4.89 111,017 4.47 112,753 -1.95 -2.37
Industries ranked 35 to 50 5.67 55,446 4.28 55,440 3.90 56,450 -1.39 -1.77
Panel A
Sales wf-delta
Panel DPanel B Panel C
Operating income Net income
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Table 2.6: Subsets 3, 4, and 5: Divided by firm size, firm valuation, and leverage. 
This table analyzes persistence in growth with respect to firm size, market valuation, and leverage. Wf-scores above 5.00 
indicate and quantify an increased persistence in growth. Wf-delta is the difference between the wf-scores of operating 
income and sales (OI-S) as well as net income and sales (NI-S).  
  
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Robustness test: Firms with a very high persistence in sales growth. 
This table compares firms with a very high persistence in sales growth to firms with a low persistence in sales growth. A wf-
score of 5.00 indicates that persistence in growth is randomly distributed. Values above 5.00 indicate and quantify an 
increased persistence in growth. Wf-delta is the difference between the wf-scores of operating income and sales (OI-S) as 
well as net income and sales (NI-S). 
 
  
Operating Net Operating Net Operating Net
Sales income income OI-S NI-S Sales income income OI-S NI-S Sales income income OI-S NI-S
Large firms Glamour firms Low leverage firms
9.71 5.39 4.87 -4.32 -4.84 10.01 6.52 5.84 -3.50 -4.17 9.30 5.44 4.79 -3.86 -4.51
Mid-cap firms Moderate valuation firms Median leverage firms
7.42 4.81 4.39 -2.61 -3.03 7.75 4.79 4.34 -2.96 -3.41 7.78 4.87 4.50 -2.91 -3.28
Small firms Value firms High leverage firms
4.36 4.86 4.42 0.50 0.06 5.18 3.85 3.53 -1.33 -1.65 5.43 4.75 4.45 -0.68 -0.98
Panel C: Leverage
wf-score wf-scorewf-delta wf-delta wf-score wf-delta
Panel A: Firm size Panel B: Firm valuation
Operating Net Operating Net
Sales income income OI-S NI-S Sales income income OI-S NI-S
18.53 7.35 6.36 -11.18 -12.17 2.68 3.93 3.73 1.25 1.05
Operating Net Operating Net
Sales income income OI-S NI-S Sales income income OI-S NI-S
14.34 6.51 5.71 -7.83 -8.63 1.78 3.69 3.55 1.91 0.00
Group B1: Firms with at least one four-year run in sales Group B2: Firms with less than four-year runs in sales
Panel A:
Panel B:
wf-score wf-delta wf-score wf-delta
Group A1: Firms with at least one five-year run in sales Group A2: Firms with less than five-year runs in sales
wf-score wf-delta wf-score wf-delta
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Table 2.8: Correlation between wf-delta and persistence in growth of operating expenses. 
This table analyzes persistence in expense growth using the wf-score approach. Instead of growth rates in operating 
performance, growth rates in operating expenses (“cost of goods sold” and “selling, general, and administrative expenses”) 
are used. N is the number of firm-years. The wf-deltas are taken from the previous analyses and based on operating income 
and sales (OI-S). The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between the wf-deltas and the wf-scores. Coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OI-S
Subset of firms wf-delta wf-score N wf-score N
Firms with at least one five-year run in sales -11.18 14.82 62,244 13.09 48,726
Firms with at least one four-year run in sales -7.83 12.02 92,773 11.18 72,082
Large firms -4.32 9.09 44,319 10.24 35,281
Low leverage firms -3.86 8.67 34,356 8.72 27,850
Industries ranked 1 to 16 -3.72 8.37 78,750 8.40 65,098
Glamour firms -3.50 8.89 53,259 9.15 44,362
Moderate valuation firms -2.96 7.25 79,236 7.33 61,965
Median leverage firms -2.91 7.17 113,285 7.28 84,493
Mid-cap firms -2.61 6.90 115,038 6.82 90,743
Countries ranked 1 to 15 -2.60 7.19 141,721 7.44 121,900
Countries ranked 16 to 33 -2.27 6.48 42,328 5.81 27,814
Industries ranked 17 to 34 -1.95 6.44 73,263 6.66 58,521
Countries ranked 34 to 48 -1.89 5.93 18,157 5.90 9,802
Industries ranked 35 to 50 -1.39 5.38 50,193 5.28 35,897
Value firms -1.33 4.87 53,639 4.66 41,584
High leverage firms -0.68 5.09 35,238 5.07 27,661
Small firms 0.50 4.00 31,180 3.28 23,822
Firms with less than five-year runs in sales 1.25 3.42 139,962 4.41 110,790
Firms with less than four-year runs in sales 1.91 2.62 109,433 3.67 87,434
Correlation coefficient -0,99*** -0,95***
Selling, general and 
administrative expensesCost of goods sold
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3. Predicting above-median and below-median growth rates 
 
(with Sebastian Lobe) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Multiannual periods of consecutive above-median or below-median growth rates in operating 
performance, called “runs”, have substantial influence on firm valuations. This paper 
examines the predictability of runs. To utilize information efficiently, we employ a stepwise 
regression to endogenously identify the parsimonious indicator-specific set of economically 
and empirically meaningful variables in estimating the probability of an above-median or 
below-median run. Our novel approach estimates logit models and performs a multiple 
discriminant analysis to distinguish between firms that will consistently grow above or below 
the market over a period of six years. In-sample and out-of-sample classification tests 
corroborate that there is some predictability.  
 
 
 
Keywords: operating performance growth rate, persistence, prediction 
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3.1. Introduction 
Prolonged periods of consecutive high or low growth rates in operating performance growth 
influence stock market valuations and returns. Prior literature shows that firms with 
consistently high past growth rates are strongly rewarded by the stock market (Lakonishok et 
al., 1994). At the same time, firms with a multiannual track record of low growth rates suffer 
severe devaluation. This is because many investors consider past growth as a meaningful 
predictor for a firm's future performance. Yet, research also shows (La Porta, 1996; La Porta 
et al., 1997) that investors tend to extrapolate past growth too far into the future. Buying a 
stock with an impressive record of recent, for instance, above-median growth bears the risk to 
invest in an overvalued stock which will probably not satisfy the high growth expectations. 
Clearly, investors are most interested to know ex ante which firms will consistently over- or 
underperform the market over the next years.  
In this paper, we examine the predictability of above-median and below-median growth rates 
in operating performance over a period of up to six consecutive years. A large body of the 
literature already deals with predicting various aspects of a firm's future (e.g., Altman, 1968; 
Palepu, 1986; Fama and French, 1988). However, a rather neglected topic is “persistence” in 
operating performance growth rates and especially its prediction. One of the few more recent 
studies in this area is the seminal paper by Chan et al. (2003) (thereafter “CKL”). They define 
persistence as the ability of a firm to achieve above-median growth rates for a number of 
consecutive years. After concluding that its own past is a poor predictor for above-median 
growth in operating performance, they construct Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting 
regressions to predict the magnitude of future growth rates over a period of one to five years. 
However, they do not explicitly examine the predictability of prolong periods of consecutive 
above-median growth rates. We want to close this gap because we think that such an analysis 
has benefits: (1) CKL establish that predicting the magnitude of future growth rates is hardly 
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possible. It could be easier to predict a binary variable simply indicating whether a firm will 
or will not grow above the median for a number of years. (2) Predicting the exact magnitude 
of a future growth rate may not be necessary. Many investors' (e.g., mutual fund managers) 
primary target is to beat the market. Hence, as a first step, it may be sufficient to estimate the 
probability that a firm will grow above or below the median within the next several years. 
(3) Even obtaining a precise forecast of a firm's future growth rate may not be sufficient. 
Without an estimate of the future median growth rate, even a presumably high predicted 
growth rate is at risk not to outperform the market. On the other hand, a seemingly poor 
growth rate may still be adequate in times of bust. 
Accounting for this rationale, our research strategy is to compare two distinct groups of firms. 
The first group has a “positive run”, consisting of a series of above-median growth rates after 
a given point in time. The second group of firms has a “negative run”, consisting of below-
median growth rates. This setting makes it possible to use binary response models. We 
compare groups of firms with varying future runs in growth rates over a period of six years. 
Our goal is to examine whether a set of widely used financial variables helps to differentiate 
these groups and hence to predict series of above-median or below-median growth rates. In a 
first step, we use pooled logit regressions. By conducting in-sample and out-of-sample 
classification tests, we evaluate the predictive power of the estimated models. In a second 
step, we apply a multiple discriminant analysis as an alternative method to check the 
robustness of our results. We finally test the power of our logit models on a more general 
level, by trying to assemble new groups of firms with superior performance in terms of 
growth rates.  
We find that predicting positive and negative runs is possible. Predictability depends on the 
length of the investment period. Over a relatively short period of time like three years, 
prediction is quite difficult. The evidence shows, however, that it is possible to differentiate 
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firms with positive or negative runs over a period of five or six years. We also establish that 
our forecasting models help to assemble new groups which include more firms with positive 
runs and fewer firms with negative runs than randomly selected ones.  
Our analysis is closely related to the term “persistence”. While the literature discusses 
persistence in many different contexts like, for instance, firm growth (e.g., Dunne and 
Hughes, 1994), mutual fund performance (e.g., Carhart, 1997), and profitability (e.g., Carey, 
1974), there is only a small literature discussing the behavior (and especially consistency) in 
operating performance growth. Two early studies are Little (1962) and Little and Rayner 
(1966). They examine the hypothesis that a firm's past growth is a good predictor of its future 
growth. They find that in a small sample of UK firms corporate annual earnings numbers are 
essentially random. Lintner and Glauber (1967) and Brealey (1983) confirm that successive 
changes in US corporate earnings appear to be randomly distributed. Many further studies 
starting with Beaver (1970) and Ball and Watts (1972) use time-series models in order to 
analyze the behavior of earnings. In their seminal paper, CKL test for persistence and 
predictability in growth rates. They focus on the question how well past growth predicts 
future growth. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other studies related to CKL. 
Anagnostopoulou and Levis (2008) examine the sustainability or persistence of operating 
growth and market performance as a result of R&D investments. Hall and Tochterman (2008) 
measure the persistence and predictability of sales and earnings growth for Australian listed 
companies from 1989 to 2006. Our paper contributes to the literature a novel approach 
providing new evidence on a specific aspect of persistence. We show that periods of 
consecutive above-median and below-median growth rates are predictable based on a set of 
financial indicators. Since firm valuations strongly depend on such time periods, it is 
important to know the factors indicating future above-median or below-median growth rates.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes our sample and explains 
how runs are defined and compared. Section 3.3 introduces the logit model and the 
explanatory variables. Section 3.4 presents the results, conducts a classification test, and 
performs a multiple discriminant analysis as robustness check. In section 3.5, we confirm the 
predictability of runs based on a more general setting. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2. Data and methodology 
3.2.1. Data 
Data for this study are obtained from Thomson Datastream and Worldscope. In a first step, 
we select all active and inactive US equities recorded in the database. We include all available 
types of equities except ADRs and closed-end funds. After screening the data for a multiple 
collection of the same company, data errors and missing data, the initial sample comprises 
17,038 firms. Following the method of CKL, we measure operating performance based on the 
year-end values of (1) net sales or revenues, (2) operating income, and (3) net income before 
extraordinary items and preferred dividends (in US dollars).6 The sample period starts in 1980 
and ends in 2008. Time-series of inactive firms are included in the dataset during their time of 
existence.  
At every calendar year-end we calculate growth in operating performance as follows, 
 
,, = 	
, − 	
,	
,  (3.1) 
 
where g is the growth rate of firm i over the year t-1 to t. PI denotes the operating 
performance indicator. We calculate growth on a per share basis, taking the perspective of an 
investor who buys and holds shares over a specific holding period. The number of shares 
outstanding is adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends. While CKL initially assume that 
                                            
6
 Worldscope items WC01001, WC01250, and WC01551. 
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dividends are reinvested taking into account different dividend payout policies, they drop this 
assumption for their predictive regressions. We therefore do not assume dividend 
reinvestment, either. We exclude financial firms from our analysis because some financial 
statement items do not have the same meaning for every firm. For instance, high leverage of 
nonfinancial firms more likely indicates distress and dwindling profits, while this is a more 
normal scenario for financial firms. We define financial institutions according to Fama and 
French (1997). Our final data set encompasses 13,751 US firms of which 5,569 exist at the 
end of our sample period in 2008. 
3.2.2. Runs of above-median or below-median growth rates 
Adopting the method of CKL, we define a run in operating performance growth as follows. 
Each year, based on all available growth rates (e.g., sales) we calculate the median growth 
rate. We then determine how many consecutive years a firm achieves to beat the median. We 
call this a positive run. For instance, a firm that realizes growth rates above the median for 
four years in a row has a four-year positive run. We extend the method of CKL by 
considering the opposite event as well, which we label a negative run. In this case, a firm 
performs below the median for several consecutive years. Based on this information, for each 
firm and each year we obtain an indicator whether a particular firm currently has a positive or 
negative run and how long it already lasts. Table 3.1 provides an example. The firm starts a 
three-year positive run in 1991. In 1994, the run ends due to a below-median growth rate. The 
losing streak from 1994 till 1996 with below-median growth rates represents a three-year 
negative run. 
Table 3.2 summarizes our sample in terms of firm-years with a current positive or negative 
run length between one and six years. The number of observations beyond six years is very 
low. The expected probability of a seven-year run is only about 0.8%. In order to ensure a 
sufficient number of observations, we limit our analysis to a maximum of six years. Our 
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sample also comprises firms with very long runs. However, these observations are extremely 
rare. Only one single firm, Walmart Stores Inc., had a maximum 28-year positive run in sales 
growth during the sample period. According to Table 3.2, there are generally more firms with 
extended runs in sales growth than firms with extended runs in operating income growth and 
net income growth. This has two reasons. First, on a technical note there are generally more 
sales growth rates available. In case of negative accounting figures it is not possible to 
calculate valid growth rates. As sales accounting figures are significantly less volatile than 
income figures and usually positive, we obtain more sales growth rates than income growth 
rates. Second, in line with CKL, we confirm that there is more consistency in sales growth 
than in income growth. This could be due to the fact that additional drivers like earnings 
management, production costs and other expenses influence the income number relative to the 
sales figure which simply expresses supply and demand. 
3.3. The logit model 
For our research approach, binary logit regressions are well suited. For example, Ou and 
Penman (1989) use logit regressions and a large set of financial statement items to predict the 
direction of one-year-ahead earnings changes.7 We estimate the following pooled logit 
regression to specify the relationship between firm characteristics and the likelihood P of 
belonging to the “positive run group”: 
 
P,, = 1  = "#$%&'(%),*+ (3.2) 
 
where ,,  is a binary indicator that equals one if firm i starts a positive run in year t+1 for 
the next l years. The indicator is zero if the firm's growth is not consistently above the 
                                            
7
 This method is also very often used in the literature on bankruptcy prediction (e.g., Martin, 1977; Ohlson, 
1980; Shumway, 2001; Campbell et al., 2008), and in the literature on takeover target prediction (e.g., Palepu, 
1986; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003; Cremers et al., 2009). 
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median, defined simply as “negative run group”. ,, is a vector of explanatory variables of 
firm i measured at the end of year t, - is the estimated intercept, and . is a vector of 
coefficients. 
3.3.1. Comparing groups of firms with positive and negative runs 
We focus on the long-term. Thus, we look at an investment period l between three and six 
(3 ≤  ≤ 6) years (y). We additionally assume that each firm at least grows above the median 
in the first year. This assumption helps us to assess the long-term rather than the short-term 
predictability of runs. The following five scenarios are helpful in distinguishing firms with 
positive and negative runs. 
(1) 3y vs. 1y: The positive run group contains firms that will grow above the median for (at 
least) the next three years (Y=1). The negative run group contains firms that will grow above 
the median in the first year and below the median for the following two years (Y=0). The 
investment period l is three years. Eligible firms require at least three consecutive growth 
rates. 
(2) 4y vs. 1y: The positive run group contains firms that will grow above the median for (at 
least) the next four years (Y=1). The negative run group contains firms that will grow above 
the median in the first year and below the median for the following three years (Y=0). The 
investment period l is four years. Eligible firms require at least four consecutive growth rates. 
(3) 5y vs. 1y: The positive run group contains firms that will grow above the median for (at 
least) the next five years (Y=1). The negative run group contains firms that will grow above 
the median in the first year and below the median for the following four years (Y=0). The 
investment period l is five years. Eligible firms require at least five consecutive growth rates. 
(4) 6y vs. 1y: The positive run group contains firms that will grow above the median for (at 
least) the next six years (Y=1). The negative run group contains firms that will grow above 
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the median in the first year and below the median for the following five years (Y=0). The 
investment period l is six years. Eligible firms require at least six consecutive growth rates. 
(5) 6y vs. 3y: The positive run group contains firms that will grow above the median for (at 
least) the next six years (Y=1). The negative run group contains firms that will grow above 
the median in the first three years and below the median for the following three years (Y=0). 
The investment period l is six years. Eligible firms require at least six consecutive growth 
rates. 
We expect that distinguishing the positive and the negative run groups ex ante becomes easier 
the longer we extend the investment period l. Growth rates of the firms of the “3y vs. 1y” 
combination behave differently only for at least two years. The firms of the “6y vs. 1y” 
combination, however, differ over a period of at least five years. We hypothesize that 
predicting positive and negative runs over long horizons should lead to greater power. The 
last scenario tightens our analysis, assuming that both groups grow above the median within 
the first three years. 
3.3.2. Explanatory variables 
We use accounting and equity market variables which are publicly available. Variables are 
measured annually by the end of the calendar year before the run starts. We assume that at 
this point of time all required accounting data is available to the market. 
CKL test some variables to predict annual growth rates over one to five years. We adopt most 
of these variables for our analysis. PASTGS5 is the growth in sales of the past five years8, EP 
is the earnings to price ratio, G is the sustainable growth rate given by the product of return on 
equity (income before extraordinary items available to common equity relative to book 
equity) and the plowback ratio (one minus the ratio of total dividends to common equity 
divided by income before extraordinary items available to common equity), RDSALES is the 
                                            
8
 We use annualized growth rates. 
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ratio of research and development expenditures to sales, BM is the book-to-market ratio, 
PASTR6 is the stock’s prior six-month rate of return, and DP is the dividend to price ratio. We 
exclude the dummy variable TECH which indicates if a firm is in the pharmaceutical and 
technology sector. CKL find that this variable has clearly no predictive power. We try our 
best not to miss out further obvious candidates which might be able to predict a run. 
The prediction of bankruptcies and takeovers is also based on operative performance variables 
and the respective market evaluation. Lending from this research, we collect a range of well-
known variables. The following ratios stem from Altman (1968). WCTA is working capital to 
total assets, RETA is retained earnings to total assets, EBITTA is earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets, METL is market value equity to total liabilities and STA is sales to total 
assets. The variables NITA net income to total assets, TLTA total liabilities to total assets, and 
CACL current assets to current liabilities come from Zmijewski (1984). Additionally, we 
include a wide range of profitability measures. CPM is the cross profit margin (sales minus 
cost of goods sold divided by sales), OPM is the operating profit margin, NPM is the net 
profit margin, ROE is return on equity, and OCR is the overhead cost ratio.9 
In total, we include 20 independent variables in our logit analysis. Table 3.3 summarizes 
statistical properties of the variables and reports the expected sign of correlation with future 
positive runs. All variables except the book-to-market ratio BM are winsorized at the first and 
99th percentiles of their pooled distributions across all firm-years. We delete all negative 
values of BM and then winsorize at the 99th percentile. Following CKL, we set RDSALES to 
zero if a firm has no R&D spending. 
Table 3.4 displays a matrix with pairwise Pearson correlations of the independent variables. 
Almost all correlations are significant at the 1% level. Only a few variables like net profit 
                                            
9
 To calculate these variables we use the Datastream and Worldscope items WC01051, WC03501, WC01101, 
WC05101, WC03351, P, WC03151, WC02999, WC08001, WC18191, WC02201, WC03101, WC03495, 
MTVB, WC01201, WC09504, WC01001,WC01250, and WC01551. 
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margin NPM and operating profit margin OPM are highly correlated (0.969). However, 
multicollinearity is no severe issue because we control for highly correlated variables with a 
stepwise regression approach in the next section. 
3.3.3. Variable selection 
For an efficient use of the information contained in the explanatory variables, we employ a 
stepwise regression with forward selection and backward elimination to endogenously 
identify the parsimonious indicator-specific set of variables to be included in estimating the 
probability of a positive or negative run. It is this parsimony which is one of the advantages of 
this procedure, while one of its disadvantages is the collapse of standard statistical inference. 
This shortcoming is a potential concern, but should only deteriorate the power of the 
parsimoniously extracted variables to explain the out-of-sample variation in the probability of 
a positive or negative run. Since we are able to replicate reasonably the out-of-sample 
probability of a positive or negative run, we feel that the advantages of using a stepwise 
regression procedure outweigh its confinements. Admitting for each of the three operating 
performance indicators an individual set of independent variables, this selection technique 
starts with either an empty or a saturated model and tries out all variables one by one. Based 
on statistical significance the method either includes (forward selection) or excludes 
(backward elimination) one variable after another. To keep our indicator-specific models 
parsimonious and to abstain from a data mining exercise, we select the “3y vs. 1y” scenario as 
the base line model, because this scenario has probably the most difficulties in differentiating 
the positive and the negative run group. We specify an alpha-to-enter of 0.05 and an alpha-to-
remove of 0.1. Firms need to have non-missing values for all predictor variables to be 
included. For model parsimony, a variable has to be significant at the 10% level in both 
procedures in order to enter the logit model. We use Wald tests to determine the statistical 
significance. Unreported tests show that using likelihood ratio tests does not affect the overall 
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results. The final set of explanatory variables to predict runs in sales growth consists of total 
liabilities to total assets TLTA, the stock's prior six-month rate of return PASTR6, and the 
dividend to price ratio DP. The predictors for runs in operating income growth are operating 
profit margin OPM, dividend to price DP, and research and development expenditures to 
sales RDSALES. Finally, dividend to price DP, the market value of equity to total liabilities 
METL, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets EBITTA, and net profit margin NPM 
predict runs in net income growth. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Logit model estimates 
We randomly split our initial sample into a training sample and a hold-out (validation) sample 
(e.g., Frank et al., 1965). The two sub-samples are divided in a 6:4 split to have a sufficient 
number of observations for model training, especially with respect to the “6y vs. 1y” and “6y 
vs. 3y” combinations.10 Table 3.5 reports the results of logit regression estimates based on the 
training sample. In Panel A runs are calculated based on sales growth. Panels B and C analyze 
operating income growth and net income growth. The first four columns in each panel present 
models for the “3y vs. 1y”, “4y vs. 1y”, “5y vs. 1y” and “6y vs. 1y” combinations of the two 
groups. In the fifth column we report results of the “6y vs. 3y” scenario. 
According to the likelihood ratio chi-square statistics all models except the “6y vs. 3y” net 
income model are significant at the 1% level. As expected, over an investment period of three 
years it is unlikely to correctly forecast if a company will either enjoy a three-year positive 
run or not. The McFadden's pseudo-R2 coefficients of the “3y vs. 1y” models are only 0.031 
for sales growth, 0.031 for operating income growth, and 0.049 for net income growth. The 
predictive power of the models increases, however, the longer the investment period is. This 
                                            
10
 Minor deviations from this ratio are due to the random selection procedure. 
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is especially evident for the “6y vs. 1y” models. The pseudo-R2 coefficients are 0.211 for 
sales growth, 0.274 for operating income growth, and 0.222 for net income growth. The 
results of the “6y vs. 3y” models suggest that it is very difficult to distinguish firms which 
have a positive run for the first three years. Pseudo-R2s range between 0.041 (net income) and 
0.120 (sales). 
The most salient variable is the dividend to price ratio DP which is the only one included in 
all the regression specifications. The sign is consistently negative as expected. This finding is 
intuitive. Firms paying high dividends have fewer funds for investments and thus lower future 
growth. CKL also find that a low dividend yield is associated with high future growth in 
operating performance. Total liabilities to total assets TLTA exhibit also the expected negative 
sign for all sales models. This means that low leverage firms have a higher chance to enjoy a 
multi-year positive run. This link between capital structure and future investment 
opportunities is consistent with prior research (Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
variable rate of return of the past six months PASTR6, which is related to momentum 
strategies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), shows the expected 
positive sign. A possible explanation is that investors preferring to buy past winners are 
likewise attracted to firms generating a high consistency in sales growth rates (Chan et al., 
2003). In combination with the fact that this variable is not selected when predicting income 
growth, it suggests two more things. First, firms are not very successful in translating runs in 
sales growth into runs in income growth. Second, in line with the investor overreaction 
hypothesis (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; De Bondt and Thaler, 1990) past winners are not 
necessarily long-term future winners.  
The coefficients of operating profit margin OPM are interestingly negative in the income 
models. Contrary to intuition, a high operating profit margin does not forecast positive runs in 
operating income growth. The data suggest that firms with a high operating profit margin 
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have little potential for further improvements in operating efficiency. Hence, high operating 
income growth rates need to be generated solely by growth in sales, which may turn out 
difficult. Firms with a lot of potential for efficiency improvements may compensate growth 
restrictions on the sales side. The ratio of R&D expenditures to sales RDSALES has a positive 
sign in all operating income models as hypothesized. The coefficients suggest that high R&D 
investments foster future growth, in particular long-term growth. CKL and other prior studies 
find a similar relationship (Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Eberhart et al., 
2004).  
The coefficients of market equity to total liabilities METL have the expected positive sign for 
the net income models. This is basically in line with the evidence on TLTA. Although selected 
by stepwise regression, the variable EBIT to total assets EBITTA has little predictive power. 
Similar to OPM, net profit margin NPM has a negative sign. 
3.4.2. Classification test 
We assess the ability of the previously estimated logit models to correctly classify a firm into 
the two categories of positive and negative runs. For this purpose, we perform in-sample and 
out-of-sample prediction tests. The drawback of the first method is that identical data is used 
for model training and validation. As a result, the reported accuracy may be positively biased. 
A common way to solve this problem is to predict data not used for model training. This 
approach is called out-of-sample validation. Since there is also evidence that results of in-
sample tests are more credible than results of out-of-sample tests (Inoue and Kilian, 2004), we 
perform both methods. The hold-out sample is set to comprise approximately 40% of the 
entire sample. The training sample comprises the remaining 60% of the sample. An important 
factor when performing classification tests is the choice of the cut-off point. Traditionally, it 
is set to 0.5. In an unbalanced sample this may be inappropriate (Cramer, 1999). For instance, 
consider 90 healthy firms and 10 unhealthy firms. A logit model simply classifying every firm 
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as healthy would have an expected classification accuracy of 90%. In order to take into 
account relative sample frequencies, we calculate the expected probability of selecting a 
negative run firm and set the cut-off point to that value. Any firm whose predicted probability 
of belonging to the positive run group exceeds this value is categorized accordingly. The 
remaining companies are allocated to the negative run group. Although we employ this more 
precise procedure, in most cases, the number of positive and negative run firms is almost the 
same. 
Table 3.6 reports the results. Panels A1, B1 and C1 test the training sample while Panels A2, 
B2 and C2 analyze how well the models classify new firms. For each performance indicator 
we evaluate the entire set of logit models. We report the percentage of firms correctly 
classified along with the type I error (firms erroneously classified as positive run firms), the 
type II error (firms misclassified as negative run firms), and the number of observations.  
The training sample and the hold-out sample yield almost similar results and reinforce our 
conclusion that there is some predictability especially over extended investment periods. The 
classification accuracy of the models corresponds with the pseudo-R2 reported in Table 3.5. 
The “3y vs. 1y” models classify on average about 60% of all firms correctly. This rate 
improves to an average of approximately 72% across the in- and out-of-sample tests of the 
“6y vs. 1y” models. The “6y vs. 3y” models perform comparably to the “3y vs. 1y” models.  
The percentage of correctly classified firms is not the only factor when evaluating the 
goodness of a model. The risk to invest in the wrong firm is at least as important as the chance 
to invest in the right firm. The type I error in our analysis stands for the risk of investing in a 
firm that will not meet the expectations. The type II error reflects the risk to let an opportunity 
slip. In other words, assuming someone only invests in firms classified as positive run firms, 
the type I error is very dangerous; the type II error is not. Thus, the primary target of an 
investor would be to minimize the type I error. Regarding this risk, the models produce quite 
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large errors. Based on the in-sample prediction, on average 40.9% of all negative run firms 
are erroneously classified as positive run firms. The respective value based on the out-of-
sample prediction is 39.0%. The type II errors are considerably lower and average 25.2% (in-
sample) and 27.9% (out-of-sample). In line with the previous results, both types of errors 
decrease with an increasing investment period. The average type I error of all “3y vs. 1y” 
models equals 46.6%. The average of all “6y vs. 1y” models is considerably lower but still 
amounts to 35.1%. The corresponding type II errors fall from 31.1% to 18.2%. Comparing the 
performance indicators, we conclude that none of them is significantly better predictable. 
3.4.3. Multiple discriminant analysis 
To check for robustness and a potentially higher predictive power, we redo the preceding 
analysis using an alternative statistical methodology. In addition to logit regressions, multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) is a well-known technique to distinguish between two groups of 
firms based on a set of financial variables. The most prominent finance paper using this 
methodology is probably Altman (1968). Relative to the logit analysis, MDA has plenty of 
assumptions.11 Due to frequent violations of these assumptions, maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques such as logit were recently more utilized. Although MDA is not as 
general as a logit analysis, for our purpose, it is well suited as an alternative method. In 
particular, one of the major advantages of MDA is that it requires less data to achieve stable 
results. In order to make the interpretation of the classification results as easy as possible, we 
construct two equally sized groups. As a result, the a priori probability of selecting a firm with 
a negative run is exactly 50%. We again use the set of variables identified in the stepwise 
regressions and randomly split into a training sample and a hold-out sample according to a 6:4 
proportion. Table 3.7 reports the results. For each of the performance indicators, we test the 
                                            
11
 MDA assumes that the independent variables are normally distributed, have no strong correlations, and that 
the variance-covariance matrix of the explanatory variables is the same for both groups. 
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run combinations as in the logit regressions. Panel A analyzes sales, Panel B operating 
income, and Panel C net income. Columns one, two, and three report the R2, Wilks' Lambda, 
and chi-square of each model. The following eight columns display for each sub-sample the 
percent of correctly classified firms, the type I and II error, and the number of cases.  
The results of the MDA corroborate the previous findings. According to the chi-square 
statistics, all except the “3y vs. 6y” net income model are significant at the 1% level. Similar 
to the logit regressions, we find a small degree of predictability over long investment periods. 
The goodness-of-fit of the “3y vs. 1y” models is only 0.035 for sales, 0.043 for operating 
income, and 0.060 for net income. As expected, the best fit is produced by the “6y vs. 1y” 
models. The R2 of the sales model amounts to 0.248, the respective operating income model 
reaches a value of 0.261, and the R2 of the net income model amounts to 0.201. The 
corresponding Wilks' Lambdas suggest the same pattern. The values of the “3y vs. 1y” and 
“6y vs. 3y” models are close to one, indicating that the two groups are poorly separated. The 
classification results reflect the model statistics. The “3y vs. 1y” models on average yield 
approximately a 60% correct classification rate across all firms in the training sample. This is 
only slightly above the a priori probability of 50%. The “5y vs. 1y” and “6y vs. 1y” models 
on average correctly classify about 71% of the firms. The out-of-sample results along with the 
type I and II errors are consistent with the in-sample results. In total, MDA yields almost the 
same classification results as the logit regressions. 
3.5. General test for predictability 
So far, we have only tried to discriminate two precisely defined groups of firms with certain 
patterns of above-median and below-median growth rates. We now extend our analysis to a 
more general level. We therefore ask whether the previously introduced logit models also help 
to assemble new groups with a higher share of firms with positive runs and a lower share of 
firms with negative runs, compared to a randomly selected group of firms.  
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The approach works as follows. By the end of year t, we select all available firms and hold 
them for the next five years. Out of this, we then construct two sub-groups of firms which we 
call “positive run group” and “negative run group”. Based on the information before year t, 
we estimate a logit model which predicts the probability of a positive or a negative future run 
for each firm. All firms whose result is greater than 50% enter the positive run group. The 
remaining firms are allocated to the second group. If the logit model actually helps to predict 
runs, the positive run group is supposed to perform better than the negative run group. This 
means, the first group should exhibit a higher share of firms with positive runs and a lower 
share with negative runs. It is possible every year that a firm either grows above or below the 
median, so over five years there are 25 = 32 possible growth paths. We focus our comparison 
on the following five growth paths: Five-year run, four-year run followed by one-year 
negative run, three-year run followed by two-year negative run, two-year run followed by 
three-year negative run, one-year run followed by four-year negative run, and five-year 
negative run. The sixth path we consider is that a firm does not survive for five years.12 To 
have as many as possible eligible growth rates we analyze sales.13 The logit models use the 
explanatory variables identified in the stepwise regressions and are trained based on the “5y 
vs. 1y” combination. The previous analyses have shown that this combination offers more 
eligible growth rates than the “6y vs. 1y” combination and still produces good forecasting 
models. We repeat the described selection procedure for each year between 1985 and 2003. 
The start year is 1985 because 1980 is the first year in our sample, and a full five-year period 
is required for model training. As time progresses more and more years add to the training 
sample. Table 3.8 reports means and medians of the shares across the time period 1985 to 
                                            
12
 Due to the comparison of two groups of surviving firms, a potential survivorship bias is basically no issue in 
our study. However, we test if the logit models can also reduce the share of non-survivors in a group of firms. 
13
 In unreported results, we also test operating income and net income with essentially the same conclusions. 
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2003. To identify significant differences between the two groups we perform two-sided paired 
t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.14 
Figure 3.1 displays the share of firms with five-year positive runs and five-year negative runs 
over the entire time period. The figure additionally reports the number of firms allocated to 
either of the two groups. The positive run group on average includes 523 firms per year, the 
negative run group 569 firms. The results show that the positive run group indeed contains 
more firms with positive runs and consistently less firms with negative runs over time. On 
average, 9.7% of all firms in the positive run group have a five-year run after group selection. 
In the negative run group on average only 2.4% achieve the same. The t-test indicates that 
these means are significantly different at the 1% level. The corresponding medians of 10.1% 
and 3.0% are likewise significantly different according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We 
also find significantly higher percentages of firms with four-year and three-year positive runs 
in the positive run group. With respect to firms with extended negative runs, we find that on 
average 3.7% of all firms in the positive run group suffer five-year negative runs. The 
according share in the second group is 9.2%. The t-tests indicate a significant difference at the 
1% level. The medians support this conclusion. The results further suggest that the positive 
run group contains slightly fewer non-surviving firms (17.3% compared to 18.6%); however, 
these differences are not significant. In total, we infer that our logit models help to predict 
positive and negative runs to some degree. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Prolonged periods of consecutive above-median or below-median growth rates in operating 
performance have strong influence on firm valuations. The objective of this study is to 
                                            
14
 Note that the set of firms is not static. Each year, a newly trained logit model and new set of financial variables 
is used to allocate the firms to either of the two groups. Therefore we do not need to calculate t-statistics with 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. 
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explore the predictability of these so called runs. We distinguish between positive runs and 
negative runs. A positive run is defined as the ability to generate growth rates that exceed the 
median growth rate of all firms for a number of consecutive years. The opposite event of 
below-median growth rates for several successive years is called a negative run. To utilize 
information efficiently, we employ stepwise regression to endogenously identify the 
parsimonious indicator-specific set of economically and empirically meaningful variables in 
estimating the probability of a positive or negative run. Using logit regressions and multiple 
discriminant analysis, we process the information contained in a set of financial variables in 
order to calculate the likelihood that a firm will have a positive run over the next years. For 
this purpose, we compare certain groups of firms over a period of three to six years. The 
estimated models are evaluated by in-sample and out-of-sample classification tests. We find 
that a set of widely utilized financial variables indeed helps to predict runs. The accuracy 
improves with increasing run length. An additional test on a general level confirms that our 
logit models help to assemble new groups of firms which include more firms with positive 
runs and fewer firms with negative runs than randomly assembled ones. 
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Table 3.1: Example of current run length. 
This table gives an example how the current length of a positive or negative run is determined. At every calendar year-end, 
we calculate the annual growth rate in operating performance on a per share basis. Each year, we calculate the median of all 
growth rates. The number of consecutive years a firm manages to grow above the median is the length of a positive run. The 
number of consecutive years a firm grows below the median is the length of a negative run. Based on this, we can determine 
the current run length of each firm by the end of each year in our sample. The example shows the current run length of one 
particular firm. Positive numbers mark positive runs, negative numbers represent negative runs. 
  
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Sample summary of current run length. 
This table summarizes the number of firm-years with a current positive and negative run length between one and six years. 
Our sample comprises all US equities with data available from Thomson Worldscope. The sample period is from 1980 till 
2008. At every calendar year-end, we calculate the annual growth rate in operating performance (measured by sales, 
operating income, and net income before extraordinary items) on a per share basis. The number of shares outstanding is 
adjusted to reflect stock splits and dividends. Each year, we calculate the median of all growth rates. The number of 
consecutive years a firm manages to grow above the median is the length of the positive run. The number of consecutive 
years a firm grows below the median is the length of a negative run. Based on this, we can determine the current run length of 
each firm by the end of each year in our sample. 
  
  
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Growth rate above the median No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Current run length -1 1 2 3 -1 -2 -3 1
Number of firm-years with current run length
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years
Panel A: Sales
Positive run 25,353 12,516 6,408 3,465 1,972 1,175
Negative run 25,168 12,629 6,698 3,691 2,054 1,226
Panel B: Operating income
Positive run 29,040 11,993 5,124 2,256 964 451
Negative run 29,078 11,866 4,818 2,011 898 441
Panel C: Net income before extraordinary items
Positive run 29,035 10,909 4,255 1,778 740 361
Negative run 29,287 10,685 3,860 1,375 541 253
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of explanatory variables. 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the initial set of explanatory variables. Our sample comprises 13,751 firms. The 
sample period is from 1980 till 2008. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The variables are selected in line with 
Chan et al. (2003), Altman (1968), and Zmijewski (1984). Additionally, we include five popular profitability measures. For 
each variable, the table reports the median, mean, the maximum value, the minimum value, the standard deviation, and the 
expected sign of correlation with a positive run. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected
Variable Definition Median Mean Max Min Std. Dev. sign
Chan et al. (2003) variables
PASTGS5 Growth rate in sales over the past five years 0.0593 0.0615 0.8743 -0.5468 0.2029 +
EP Earnings to price ratio 0.0288 -0.2068 0.6092 -4.8843 0.8387 +/-
G Sustainable growth rate 0.0998 0.1220 0.7380 0.0001 0.1076 +
(Product of return on equity and plowback ratio)
RDSALES R&D expenditures to sales ratio 0.0698 0.4943 8.7684 0.0000 1.5494 +
BM Book to market ratio 0.5348 1.1596 20.0000 0.0000 2.8132 +
PASTR6 Rate of return of the past six months 0.0000 -0.0229 1.9998 -0.8667 0.4532 +
DP Dividend to price ratio 0.0241 0.0364 0.9889 0.0001 0.0596 -
Altman (1968) variables
WCTA Working capital to total assets ratio 0.2171 0.0961 0.8667 -3.2509 0.7267 +
RETA Retained earnings to total assets ratio -0.0040 -2.5772 0.7222 -38.2588 7.7797 +
EBITTA EBIT to total assets ratio 0.0607 -0.1994 0.4115 -3.5106 0.7834 +
METL Market value equity to total liabilities ratio 2.0503 8.4328 140.8165 0.0214 20.7955 +
STA Sales to total assets ratio 1.0327 1.2035 4.3238 0.0135 0.9117 +
Zmijewski (1984) variables
NITA Net income to total assets ratio 0.0229 -0.2799 0.3045 -4.0381 0.8809 +
TLTA Total liabilities to total assets ratio 0.5198 0.6843 4.0909 0.0177 0.7702 -
CACL Current assets to current liabilities ratio 1.8550 2.8176 23.7531 0.0652 3.4902 +
Additional profitability variables
CPM Cross profit margin 0.3787 0.3924 1.0000 -1.1004 0.3134 +/-
OPM Operating profit margin 0.0524 -0.8620 0.6710 -19.3803 3.4738 +/-
NPM Net profit margin 0.0225 -1.0385 0.9733 -22.0495 3.9654 +/-
ROE Return on equity 0.0932 0.0161 3.6750 -4.5129 1.1199 +/-
OCR Overhead cost ratio 0.2744 1.0810 18.4096 0.0138 3.0937 -
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Table 3.4: Correlation matrix. 
This table reports pairwise Pearson correlations between each of the explanatory variables. *,**, and *** coeﬃcients are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PASTGS5 EP G RDSALES BM PASTR6 DP WCTA RETA EBITTA METL STA NITA TLTA CACL CPM OPM NPM ROE OCR
PASTGS5 1.000
EP 0.155*** 1.000
G 0.297*** 0.053*** 1.000
RDSALES -0.136*** -0.069*** 0.061*** 1.000
BM -0.087*** -0.302*** -0.168*** -0.036*** 1.000
PASTR6 0.024*** 0.279*** -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.147*** 1.000
DP -0.156*** -0.105*** -0.162*** 0.083*** 0.260*** -0.155*** 1.000
WCTA 0.192*** 0.301*** 0.082*** -0.006** -0.085*** 0.110*** -0.124*** 1.000
RETA 0.262*** 0.290*** 0.086*** -0.127*** -0.035*** 0.090*** -0.247*** 0.721*** 1.000
EBITTA 0.249*** 0.405*** 0.357*** -0.208*** -0.045*** 0.143*** -0.168*** 0.663*** 0.761*** 1.000
METL 0.079*** 0.069*** 0.155*** 0.135*** -0.131*** 0.178*** -0.057*** 0.097*** -0.089*** -0.173*** 1.000
STA 0.044*** -0.014*** 0.146*** -0.203*** 0.030*** 0.011*** -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.079*** 0.025*** -0.151*** 1.000
NITA 0.245*** 0.415*** 0.346*** -0.193*** -0.041*** 0.143*** -0.187*** 0.692*** 0.781*** 0.985*** -0.155*** 0.007** 1.000
TLTA -0.204*** -0.326*** -0.005 0.031*** 0.073*** -0.104*** 0.088*** -0.907*** -0.740*** -0.669*** -0.122*** 0.177*** -0.704*** 1.000
CACL 0.043*** 0.097*** 0.036*** 0.155*** -0.038*** 0.036*** -0.050*** 0.417*** 0.143*** 0.112*** 0.464*** -0.223*** 0.131*** -0.342*** 1.000
CPM 0.108*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.040*** -0.082*** 0.049*** -0.005 0.044*** 0.029*** 0.119*** 0.077*** -0.153*** 0.114*** -0.078*** 0.027*** 1.000
OPM 0.278*** 0.190*** 0.041*** -0.626*** 0.014*** 0.073*** -0.115*** 0.273*** 0.427*** 0.574*** -0.222*** 0.259*** 0.562*** -0.268*** -0.121*** 0.215*** 1.000
NPM 0.269*** 0.235*** 0.086*** -0.597*** 0.009*** 0.081*** -0.157*** 0.295*** 0.437*** 0.604*** -0.203*** 0.256*** 0.601*** -0.290*** -0.094*** 0.206*** 0.969*** 1.000
ROE 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.226*** -0.071*** -0.013*** 0.024*** -0.058*** -0.247*** -0.129*** -0.057*** -0.066*** 0.095*** -0.071*** 0.264*** -0.082*** 0.019*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 1.000
OCR -0.262*** -0.170*** 0.033*** 0.681*** -0.022*** -0.064*** 0.110*** -0.274*** -0.427*** -0.561*** 0.227*** -0.274*** -0.550*** 0.265*** 0.117*** -0.090*** -0.969*** -0.940*** -0.034*** 1.000
71 
 
Table 3.5: Logit regressions of run indicator on predictor variables. 
This table reports results of pooled logit regressions. The sample comprises 13,751 firms. The sample period is 1980 to 2008. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The dependent variable 
is a binary variable indicating if a firm will have a positive (Y=1) or negative (Y=0) run after sample selection. Runs are measured based on sales (Panel A), operating income (Panel B), and net 
income (Panel C). For each performance indicator, five different models are estimated. The “3y vs. 1y” models try to distinguish firms that will have a run for (at least) three years and firms that will 
grow above the median in the first year and below the median for the following two years. “4y vs. 1y” compare firms that will have a run for (at least) four years and firms that that will grow above 
the median in the first year and below the median for the following three years. The “5y vs. 1y” models compare firms that will have a run for (at least) five years and firms that will grow above the 
median in the first year and below the median for the following four years. The “6y vs. 1y” models compare firms that will have a run for (at least) six years and firms that that will grow above the 
median in the first year and below the median for the following five years. “6y vs. 3y” tighten the analysis and compare firms that will have a run for (at least) six years and firms that will grow 
above the median in the first three years and below the median for the following three years. The independent variables are selected by stepwise regression (forward selection and backward 
elimination) based on the “3y vs. 1y” models. To be selected, a variable has to be significant at the 10% level in both procedures. The used variables are total liabilities to total assets TLTA, the 
stock’s prior six-month rate of return PASTR6, the dividend to price ratio DP, operating profit margin OPM, the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales RDSALES, market value 
equity to total liabilities METL, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets EBITTA, and net profit margin NPM. The absolute value of the z-statistics is reported in parentheses. Coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The table further reports the number of firm-years, the likelihood ratio chi-square, and McFadden's pseudo-R2. 
  
 
 
3y vs. 1y 4y vs. 1y 5y vs. 1y 6y vs. 1y 6y vs. 3y 3y vs. 1y 4y vs. 1y 5y vs. 1y 6y vs. 1y 6y vs. 3y 3y vs. 1y 4y vs. 1y 5y vs. 1y 6y vs. 1y 6y vs. 3y
TLTA -1.353 -2.129 -2.242 -2.173 -2.719
(-5.22)*** (-5.71)*** (-4.20)*** (-3.21)*** (-3.29)***
PASTR6 0.620 0.548 1.156 0.307 0.850
(3.17)*** (2.16)** (3.16)*** (0.68) (1.51)
DP -7.167 -11.822 -27.900 -40.390 -29.033 -10.400 -29.413 -41.556 -47.501 -30.009 -11.282 -22.961 -10.625 -8.368 -23.280
(-4.38)*** (-4.80)*** (-6.46)*** (-6.72)*** (-4.31)*** (-5.96)*** (-8.08)*** (-6.50)*** (-4.60)*** (-3.58)*** (-6.02)*** (-6.27)*** (-2.03)** (-1.42) (-2.11)**
OPM -2.194 -4.340 -7.790 -3.285 -0.487
(-3.94)*** (-4.55)*** (-4.50)*** (-1.41) (-0.27)
RDSALES 4.974 6.020 18.577 23.538 1.430
(2.96)*** (2.30)** (3.40)*** (3.08)*** (0.33)
METL 0.045 0.055 0.122 0.028 -0.010
(4.59)*** (2.85)*** (2.26)** (0.35) (-0.23)
EBITTA -0.173 -2.332 0.427 8.012 2.606
(-0.19) (-1.47) (0.15) (1.87)* (0.66)
NPM -6.944 -9.483 -21.157 -23.975 -4.972
(-5.87)*** (-4.27)*** (-5.00)*** (-4.14)*** (-0.75)
Constant 0.932 1.382 1.811 2.305 2.719 0.214 0.882 1.343 0.865 0.647 0.410 1.255 0.855 0.899 0.241
(6.44)*** (6.81)*** (6.21)*** (5.93)*** (6.01)*** (2.31)** (5.42)*** (5.06)*** (2.03)** (1.89)* (3.31)*** (5.76)*** (2.40)** (1.75)* (0.44)
N (firm-years) 1,843 1,036 595 361 288 1,937 917 467 205 171 1,563 702 303 140 133
LR chi2 79.2 90.9 124.6 105.2 43.8 82.3 149.8 129.0 69.4 19.8 104.0 107.5 64.7 43.0 7.4
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.063 0.151 0.211 0.120 0.031 0.122 0.211 0.274 0.084 0.049 0.111 0.159 0.222 0.041
Panel A: Sales Panel B: Operating income Panel C: Net income
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Table 3.6: Classification tests. 
This table reports classification results based on the logit models estimated in Table 3.5. The classification accuracy is based 
on the training sample and the hold-out sample. The training sample contains 60% of the entire sample, while the hold-out 
sample contains the remaining 40%. For each model and each performance indicator we report the percent of firms correctly 
classified, the type I error (firms misclassified as positive run firms), the type II error (firms misclassified as negative run 
firms), and the number of observations. Panels A1 and A2 analyze sales, Panels B1 and B2 operating income, and Panels C1 
and C2 net income. 
 
  
Model
Correctly
classified
Type I
error
Type II
error N
Correctly
classified
Type I
error
Type II
error N
3y vs. 1y 60.1% 42.0% 37.9% 1,843 61.5% 44.4% 32.5% 1,243
4y vs. 1y 64.2% 40.7% 30.7% 1,036 63.0% 48.6% 23.3% 665
5y vs. 1y 67.9% 37.6% 26.0% 595 70.9% 34.9% 22.9% 371
6y vs. 1y 70.6% 36.5% 21.5% 361 74.1% 36.4% 15.3% 263
6y vs. 3y 70.8% 29.5% 29.0% 288 64.7% 56.8% 20.9% 184
3y vs. 1y 57.3% 53.2% 28.7% 1,937 62.1% 42.8% 31.6% 1,254
4y vs. 1y 64.5% 44.5% 21.6% 917 64.1% 41.8% 27.7% 615
5y vs. 1y 70.7% 36.9% 16.0% 467 70.6% 35.0% 20.0% 282
6y vs. 1y 70.2% 33.1% 22.2% 205 69.7% 29.9% 31.0% 178
6y vs. 3y 59.7% 48.9% 29.9% 171 61.2% 41.7% 35.1% 129
3y vs. 1y 61.7% 47.5% 26.7% 1,563 59.5% 49.4% 29.5% 1,068
4y vs. 1y 67.5% 42.1% 20.9% 702 68.9% 42.1% 15.0% 441
5y vs. 1y 69.0% 38.0% 20.2% 303 71.7% 21.2% 35.9% 191
6y vs. 1y 77.1% 31.5% 13.4% 140 70.2% 43.3% 5.9% 94
6y vs. 3y 56.4% 51.3% 32.7% 133 55.6% 15.9% 71.7% 90
Panel C1: Net income Panel C2: Net income
Training sample Hold-out sample
Panel A1: Sales Panel A2: Sales
Panel B1: Operating income Panel B2: Operating income
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Table 3.7: Multiple discriminant analysis. 
This table reports results of the multiple (linear) discriminant analysis. We use the variables from Table 3.5 and estimate five 
discriminant models for each performance indicator. The first three columns report the R2 coefficients, the Wilks' Lambda, 
and the chi-square of each model. The following eight columns present results of the classification test. The classification 
accuracy is calculated based on the training sample and the hold-out sample. The training sample contains 60% of the entire 
sample; the hold-out sample contains the remaining 40%. For each model and each performance indicator, we report the 
percent of firms correctly classified, the type I error (firms misclassified as positive run firms), the type II error (firms 
misclassified as negative run firms), and the number of observations. Panel A analyzes sales, Panel B operating income, and 
Panel C net income. 
 
 
  
Table 3.8: General test for predictability. 
This table performs a more general test for predictability of above-median and below-median growth rates. The test is based 
on sales growth. The prediction period is five years. In each year t between 1985 and 2003, all available firms represent one 
group. Out of this group, two sub-groups are constructed. For this purpose, each year a logit model is estimated using all 
available information before year t. The models are trained based on the “5y vs. 1y” combination. The first year for model 
training is 1980. The explanatory variables are total liabilities to total assets TLTA, the stock’s prior six-month rate of return 
PASTR6, and the dividend to price ratio DP. All firms whose estimated probability of enjoying a positive run in the next five 
years exceeds 50% enter the “positive run group”. The remaining firms are allocated to the “negative run group”. Each year, 
the share of firms in the two sub-groups with the following growth paths is calculated: Five-year positive run, four-year 
positive run followed by one-year negative run, three-year positive run followed by two-year negative run, two-year positive 
run followed by three-year negative run, one-year positive run followed by four-year negative run, and five-year negative 
run. Additionally, the share of remaining survivors and non-survivors is calculated. The table reports means and medians 
across all years between 1985 and 2003. Differences in the means are tested by two-sided paired t-tests, while differences in 
the medians are tested by Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Columns three and six report p-values. 
  
  
Model R2
Wilks' 
Lambda Chi2
Correctly
classified
Type I
error
Type II
error N
Correctly
classified
Type I
error
Type II
error N
Panel (A): Sales
3y vs. 1y 0.035 0.965 65.5 59.0% 41.1% 40.8% 1,828 61.6% 36.7% 40.0% 1,220
4y vs. 1y 0.093 0.907 94.2 64.6% 38.5% 32.3% 972 64.0% 38.3% 33.6% 648
5y vs. 1y 0.146 0.854 86.8 68.7% 39.9% 22.8% 552 67.7% 36.4% 28.3% 368
6y vs. 1y 0.248 0.752 102.6 73.6% 35.2% 17.6% 364 70.2% 43.8% 15.7% 242
6y vs. 3y 0.189 0.811 41.7 69.3% 32.7% 28.7% 202 70.6% 38.2% 20.6% 136
Panel (B): Operating income
3y vs. 1y 0.043 0.957 72.7 60.6% 49.3% 29.5% 1,654 60.5% 50.3% 28.7% 1,102
4y vs. 1y 0.142 0.859 111.8 66.8% 47.0% 19.3% 736 64.1% 51.4% 20.4% 490
5y vs. 1y 0.191 0.809 68.9 70.7% 45.1% 13.4% 328 70.0% 48.2% 11.8% 220
6y vs. 1y 0.261 0.739 47.3 71.9% 38.8% 17.5% 160 67.6% 53.7% 11.1% 108
6y vs. 3y 0.120 0.880 19.9 65.6% 43.8% 25.0% 160 58.3% 61.1% 22.2% 108
Panel (C): Net income
3y vs. 1y 0.060 0.940 85.9 62.9% 50.3% 23.9% 1,396 60.6% 53.9% 24.9% 932
4y vs. 1y 0.130 0.870 83.3 70.5% 42.3% 16.7% 600 70.0% 44.0% 16.0% 400
5y vs. 1y 0.195 0.805 54.3 74.0% 39.4% 12.6% 254 68.5% 46.4% 16.7% 168
6y vs. 1y 0.201 0.799 26.4 72.1% 37.7% 18.0% 122 75.0% 37.5% 12.5% 80
6y vs. 3y 0.054 0.946 6.5 63.1% 34.4% 39.3% 122 52.5% 32.5% 62.5% 80
Training sample Hold-out sample
Mean
Sales growth (1985 - 2003)
Survivors
Positive 
run 
group
Negative 
run 
group
t-test
(p-value)
Positive 
run 
group
Negative 
run 
group
Wilcoxon
rank-sum test
(p-value)
5-year positive run 9.7% 2.4% 0.0% 10.1% 3.0% 0.0%
4-year positive run, 1-year negative run 4.4% 2.0% 0.0% 3.2% 1.6% 0.2%
3-year positive run, 2-year negative run 3.8% 2.4% 0.2% 3.1% 2.2% 3.0%
2-year positive run, 3-year negative run 3.2% 2.9% 25.9% 3.0% 2.5% 64.0%
1-year positive run, 4-year negative run 3.5% 4.2% 1.8% 3.4% 3.7% 20.9%
5-year negative run 3.7% 9.2% 0.0% 2.9% 7.3% 0.0%
Remaining survivors 54.5% 58.3% n.a. 54.7% 58.7% n.a.
Non-survivors 17.3% 18.6% 12.0% 18.0% 18.3% 70.4%
Sum of group 100.0% 100.0% n.a. n.a.
Median
(1985 - 2003)
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Figure 3.1: Share of firms in the positive run group and the negative run group. 
The firms are allocated by the method introduced in Table 3.8. Panel A shows the number of firms in the positive run and 
negative run group for each year. Panels B and C display the share of firms with five-year positive runs and five-year 
negative runs over the period 1985 to 2008. The reported year indicates the start of the five-year holding period when the 
firms are selected. 
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Abstract 
The British Premium Bond, which offers a monthly uncertain return solely based on a lottery, 
is an immense success. Why? Analysing hand-collected data of the past fifty-four years, we 
find that the bond bears relatively low risk in terms of CARA and CRRA utility. Since prizes 
are tax-free, the higher an individual’s tax bracket, the more it pays to invest in the lottery 
bond. However, we demonstrate that the CARA and CRRA coefficients (before and after 
taxes) do not directly influence net sales of the Premium Bond. Rather, our autoregressive 
models strongly suggest that prize skewness, the maximum holding amount and the number 
of top prizes are salient influencing factors. 
 
 
Keywords: Premium Bond, lottery bond, risk tolerance, skewness 
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4.1. Introduction 
Can saving money, without risking the principal, become an adventure? Looking at ordinary 
savings accounts, one readily answers no. An investor pays an amount of money into a bank 
account and gets fixed interest payments: a humdrum but safe way of investing. One very 
popular way of getting a thrill is gambling as people are always happy about winning a prize. 
Centuries ago, financial products were invented to capitalize on people’s fascination for 
gambling. The idea features saving money with a lottery to make things more exciting. As a 
result, the issuers usually enjoyed significantly higher sales and profits. Nowadays, lottery 
bonds or lottery-linked deposit accounts (LLDAs) are available worldwide. One very 
successful example is the British Premium Bond. Harold MacMillan, Chancellor of the 
British Exchequer, initially launched the British Premium Bond (PB) in November 1956. 
After decades of steadily increasing sales, particularly in the last 10 years, the Premium 
Bonds sky-rocketed. By the end of 2011, around 23 million people in Great Britain had 
invested about £43 billion in Premium Bonds. What makes these so successful? Because of its 
longevity, the Premium Bonds are perfect for an empirical analysis on what drives a 
successful LLDA. 
We offer answers to this question by scrutinising a unique, hand-collected set of data 
provided by the issuer. In total, we have a record over a period of fifty-four years. To 
understand if the risk attitude attracts savers, we apply the classical Arrow-Pratt constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) approaches to 
back out the indifference degree of risk tolerance. As the investment alternatives are taxed 
differentially, individual income taxes play a key role. We first focus on a simple monthly 
investment period. In doing so, we vary the amount invested and include personal wealth. We 
then study longer investment periods of five, ten and twenty years. We also discuss further 
factors potentially influencing the success of Premium Bonds. In this context, we turn our 
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attention to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and focus on prize 
skewness. To detect relationships, we conduct Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969). 
Finally, we present autoregressive models to confirm that skewness, the number of jackpots 
and the maximum holding amount are indeed factors that encourage net sales. 
Much research has already been done on analysing individual risk preferences. Often the 
central question is what risk preferences do individuals exhibit in certain situations and when 
do they accept bets with even negative expected returns? While many studies use surveys, e.g. 
Donkers et al. (2001), others analyse large data samples from TV game shows, e.g. Beetsma 
and Schotman (2001), or horse races like Jullien and Salanié (2000). Lottery bonds can also 
be analysed in this context. As these investments are not traded in an artificial environment, it 
makes them particularly interesting for empirical studies. Guillén and Tschoegl (2002) 
describe numerous examples of LLDAs with focus on examples located in Latin America. 
They conclude that these accounts are apparently more a marketing device than a source of 
funds cheaper than savings deposits. Kearney et al. (2010) survey a broad variety of prize-
linked savings (PLS) programs around the world and describe the appeal of PLS programs to 
US households and issuers. Ukhov (2010) studies the relationship between investor risk 
preference and asset returns of Russian lottery bonds. He analyses time variations in the risk 
preferences between 1889 and 1904. Green and Rydqvist (1997, 1999) study Swedish 
government lottery bonds whose coupon payments are determined by a lottery. They evaluate 
the rewards of bearing extra lottery risk, finding that prices appear to reflect this risk. They 
also report that variance reduces lottery prices. In a subsequent paper Rydqvist (2011) 
investigates risk and eﬀort aversion in the context of tax arbitrage based on Swedish lottery 
bonds. Florentsen and Rydqvist (2002) analyse the pricing of Danish lottery bonds focusing 
on tax-based explanations of abnormal ex-day returns. They find that prices fall by more than 
the lottery mean and also conclude that investors do not enjoy this lottery.  
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Despite having been continuously operated for more than fifty-four years and their high 
popularity, there are only very few studies dealing with the Premium Bond. In an early work, 
Rayner (1969) observes an initial lack of popularity of the Premium Bond program and 
examines the reasons. He tries to explain how the change in the prize structure affected the 
demand. He argues that the top prize element should be further increased, while the average 
yield can be reduced, to cheapen the cost to the Treasury (Rayner, 1969 p. 310). In a second 
paper Rayner (1970) further studies the prize structure of Premium Bonds. He supposes that 
the standard deviation is a good approximation to measure the attraction of the risk element in 
the prize structure. Tufano (2008) analyses the determinants of Premium Bond net sales. He 
finds that the Premium Bond program has both savings and gambling elements. Pfiffelmann 
(2007) analyses the optimal design for LLDAs based on the Premium Bonds as an example. 
In a related paper, Pfiffelmann (2008) continues her research assuming that investors’ 
individual preferences obey cumulative prospect theory. In the work cited above, Guillén and 
Tschoegl (2002) also state that skewness of returns is a feature to maintain investors’ interest 
in the LLDA. Many studies on gamblers’ risk attitudes discuss the importance of the third 
moment. Golec and Tamarkin (1998) point out that not only mean and variance explain 
gambling behaviour but also skewness of the returns. Garrett and Sobel (1999) find evidence 
for the relevance of skewness by examining United States lotteries. Bhattacharya and Garrett 
(2008) empirically find that the expected return from a lottery game is a decreasing and 
convex function of the skewness of the lottery game. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains the history and the 
basic design of the bond. In Section 4.3, we introduce our sample and compute the degrees of 
risk aversion and risk seeking an investor needs to exhibit in order to prefer Premium Bonds. 
Section 4.4 identifies important factors influencing net sales of the Premium Bond and 
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focuses on prize skewness as a major factor. In Section 4.5, multivariate autoregressive 
models combine the previous findings. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. History of the Premium Bond and its characteristics 
The Premium Bond is issued by National Savings and Investments (NS&I), which has been a 
government department since 1969. It aims to help reduce the cost to the taxpayer of 
government borrowing.15 Launched in 1956, the Premium Bond has been slowly expanding 
over 35 years. Since 1994, sales have been strongly increasing. The following statistics 
clearly express this increase. From October 1969 till December 1993, monthly net sales 
averaged about £25.4 million expressed in April 2006 pounds. In the following twelve years 
from January 1994 to April 2006, monthly net sales averaged £217.8 million (in April 2006 
pounds) which equals an increase by the factor of 8.6. Meanwhile, Premium Bonds definitely 
enjoy the highest popularity since about 43% of the population own these. The bond is one of 
the most important investment products in Great Britain for households and it is NS&I’s most 
successful asset. In March 2002, the total amount invested was £17.3 billion which equalled a 
27.8% share of the total amount invested in NS&I products. Within ten years, the amount 
increased to £43.1 billion and the share climbed to 43.6%.  
The initial purpose of the Premium Bond was to control inflation and to encourage more 
people after World War II to save money. For almost thirty years (1950s – 1980s) gambling 
this way was advertised as a fun way of saving and investing money. The National Lottery 
was then launched years later in November 1994. Since the 1990s, NS&I changed its 
marketing strategy and emphasised that Premium Bonds are a serious way of investing 
money, leading to a huge escalation in sales. 
The basic design of the bond is quite simple and has not been altered since its conception: any 
British citizen aged 16 and over can buy Premium Bonds. It is not possible to hold them 
                                            
15
 http://www.nsandi.com/about-nsi-what-we-do visited: 20 December 2011. 
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jointly and they are not transferable to another person. The minimum investment is currently 
(as at December 2011) £100 or £50 with a monthly standing order. Unlike a common deposit 
account, the total interest payments per month are subject to a lottery. There are no additional 
interest payments. The fee for participating in the prize draws is just the forgone interest 
payment of an alternative investment. For each single pound invested, there is one chance to 
win. Currently, the maximum amount a person can invest is £30,000. For example, if 
someone buys Premium Bonds worth £3,000, he or she has 3,000 chances to win. Each bond 
has exactly the same chance, making time of purchase irrelevant. The prize draws are carried 
out at the beginning of each month by a sophisticated computer system, which NS&I calls 
ERNIE (Electronic Random Number Indicator Equipment). The odds of winning a prize are 
currently 24,000 to 1. This means that an investor holding £24,000 can expect to win once per 
month on average. Of course, this is not guaranteed. After several changes, the prizes are 
currently spread from £25 up to £1 million. The total number of prizes per month is calculated 
by the total number of eligible bond units divided by the odds. The total value of all prizes of 
a draw is determined by the interest rate that is announced in advance. NS&I can arbitrarily 
change this rate. On their official web page, NS&I states that 89% of the prize fund is 
allocated to the lower prize band; 5% to the medium band; and 6% to the higher prize band.16 
Table 4.1 illustrates the distribution of a typical prize draw.  
One special feature of the Premium Bond is that all prizes are tax-free, making them even 
more attractive for potential savers. Unlike a regular lottery, the initial investment is not used 
up. Moreover, a bond holder can always get the principal refunded at any time. This 
advantage, plus the maximum holding stipulation, controls the risk of addiction and possible 
financial ruin. 
                                            
16
 http://www.nsandi.com/savings-current-interest-rates-premium-bonds-prize-draw-details visited: 20 December 
2011. 
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4.3. Classical risk tolerance analysis 
4.3.1. Research method and preliminary considerations 
In this section, we analyse the extent to which an investor needs to be risk-averse or risk-
seeking in order to consider Premium Bonds a utility maximising investment. A classical 
approach is the expected utility theory operationalized by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964).  
 
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA):   
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In the above equations, x stands for the amount of payment, - for the individual risk 
preference and 8(,) for the utility of x. e is the base of the natural logarithm. To obtain the 
indifference level of risk tolerance, we iteratively calculate the coefficient -
 
which leads to 
the same utility of a risky Premium Bond and a certain alternative investment. For 
comparison, we compute both, the constant absolute risk aversion and the constant relative 
risk aversion. The expected utility of the Premium Bond for a month´s draw is obtained as 
follows. 
[ ]  ⋅ =
⋅
∑
n
i
i i i
i=1
cE u(x) = p u(x ),  p
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                                           (4.3) 
We calculate the utility 8(,) of each prize xi of a draw, including the case that nothing is 
won. Utility components are weighted with the specific probability of occurrence pi. To 
calculate these probabilities, we divide the number of prizes in each prize class ci (e.g., 45 
times £10,000) by the total number of prizes of this draw t (e.g., December 2011: 1,788,609). 
This likelihood is divided by the odds o to obtain the probability pi that a one-pound bond 
wins exactly this prize.  
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Monthly interest payments determine the utility of a certain investment. By iterative 
calculation, we obtain values for - (CARA, CRRA). An individual investor exhibiting this 
indifference risk coefficient would be indifferent between the two alternatives. As - is a small 
number and very sensitive with respect to the accuracy of the interpolation, we perform our 
calculations with 300 decimal places. Positive (negative) values of - indicate risk aversion 
(risk seeking) across time. A zero value means risk neutrality. Savers who are less risk-averse 
or more risk-seeking than the indifference level will choose the Premium Bond since this 
maximises their utility.  
Next, we need to specify reference investments. As we try to employ the longest data record 
possible, the official Bank of England’s (BoE) rate matches this objective nicely. While we 
are aware that a retail investor cannot invest in a bond delivering the BoE rate, most bonds in 
the UK should be linked to this rate to a greater or lesser extent. To understand how Premium 
Bonds perform in comparison to a product an investor can actually purchase, we choose to 
pick the Income Bond delivering monthly interest payments. This investment, issued as well 
by NS&I, implies that there will not be a differing issuer’s risk premium. Since NS&I is 
backed by the government, the products are essentially risk-free. Premium Bonds and Income 
Bonds are similar in terms of the initial investment, the monthly payout structure, the option 
to withdraw the safe capital at any time and the infinite time to maturity. However, the 
Income Bond’s monthly interest payment is certain, and the interest rate is usually higher but 
subject to income taxation.  
For our analysis, the margin between the interest rate of the Premium Bond and that of other 
investments is crucial. High expected returns of the lottery bond compared with other 
investments can encourage even risk-averse investors to buy it. Figure 4.1, illustrating the 
corresponding time series, shows how the interest rates of the observed investments have 
changed in the last fifty-four years. 
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Another key element is taxation. For the fiscal year 2011-12 the UK tax legislation 
distinguishes between four taxable bands: starting rate (10% rate), basic rate (20% rate), 
higher rate (40% rate), and additional rate (50% rate). Due to personal allowances, (e.g. 2011-
12 £7,475), some savers are not liable for taxation. As previously noted, Premium Bonds 
enjoy tax exemption which makes them more attractive for savers. For example, the 1.50% 
interest rate as at December 2011 is equivalent to 3.00% for an additional rate income 
taxpayer, 2.50% for a higher rate taxpayer, and 1.88% for a basic taxpayer. Therefore, 
considering after-tax returns, it is possible that Premium Bonds outperform other risk-free 
investments. Since our analysis covers fifty-four years, we always apply the tax rates valid for 
that year in consideration. In essence, the tax classes have not changed. The tax rates, 
however, have been subject to several changes. We were able to obtain UK tax rates from the 
year 1957 until now.17 Based on these data, we analyse the four tax bands: no tax, starting 
rate, basic rate and higher rate. We assume that in the higher rate tax bracket an investor needs 
to pay the lowest rate within this band. For anyone taxed at higher rates, Premium Bonds 
would be even more attractive. Also note that the starting tax rate was not raised in all years.  
Checking the overall taxpayer distribution for the UK, we find that in 2009-10, 10.4% of all 
taxpayers were attributed to the higher rate tax, 86.9% to the basic rate tax, and 2.5% to the 
starting rate tax.18 This distribution has been relatively similar since 1993. From 1980 to 
1993, there was no starting rate and therefore more than 93% of all taxpayers were basic rate 
taxpayers. Since 27 million Britons own Premium Bonds, which representing about 43% of 
the recent population, it is reasonable to assume that most bond holders pay the basic rate. On 
average, each saver possesses about £1,600 in Premium Bonds (calculated from March 2011 
figures according to the NS&I Media Centre). In May 2006, NS&I published that more than 
                                            
17
 We would like to thank Kristian Rydqvist for providing us with data on UK tax rates. 
18
 Data on the distribution of UK taxpayers are taken from HM Revenue & Customs 
(http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/income_tax/table2-1.pdf) downloaded 23 June 2012. 
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1.5 million people have deposited £5,000 or more, accounting for about 6.5% of all bond 
holders. The maximum investment of £30,000 was held by 300.000 people, 1.3% of all 
savers. 
4.3.2. Data 
The hand-collected data comprise 655 monthly prize draws from the first draw in June 1957 
through December 2011. For each month, we have the prize breakdown, the underlying 
interest rate, the odds of winning, and the maximum individual holding cap. Furthermore, we 
also gained access to sales records, repayments and net sales from October 1969 to April 
2006. To obtain a largely consistent sample period, we supplement the missing data on net 
sales with approximated values. We therefore estimate monthly net sales as difference 
between the corresponding total amounts invested in Premium Bonds by the end of each 
month. Since NS&I publish monthly data on the total prize fund value and the underlying 
interest rate, it is possible to derive the total number of eligible one-pound bonds (total 
amount invested). As a check, we compare the original NS&I provided data with the 
calculated net sales before April 2006. The average accuracy is more than 98%. Using this 
method, in total we obtain net sales from October 1969 until December 2011. This equals 507 
monthly observations.  
The Income Bond data contain all the interest rates commencing in July 1982, when the bond 
was initially launched, until December 2011. To make the savings accounts comparable, we 
identify the Income Bond interest rate at the beginning of each month, yielding 354 
observations. We also collect the official Bank of England base rate at the beginning of each 
month from June 1957 to December 2011 (655 observations). Additionally, for a long-run 
analysis, we use 240 Bank of England UK nominal spot curves at the month’s beginning 
(January 1979 till December 1998). 
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4.3.3. Short-run risk coefficients 
Starting off with a myopic approach, we compute the value of - for each month from June 
1957 until December 2011. Assuming that an investor deposits £1 and does not intend to get 
her principal refunded within or right after the time period, then her only concern is the 
monthly lottery winnings or the interest payments. Furthermore, our investor possesses no 
additional wealth which influences the CRRA utility function. This simple initial setting will 
be later extended. By iteration, we can calculate the indifference risk coefficient -. 
Knowledge of this figure over the whole time frame tells an investor ex post if the decision in 
favour of the Premium Bond has been utility maximizing or not, with respect to his individual 
degree of risk tolerance. By tracking the --values over the full time period, we can assess 
which individual risk preferences savers need to exhibit in order to consider the Premium 
Bond an attractive way of saving money and how these change over the past decades.  
Since this is the lengthiest data record available, we start with a virtual alternative investment 
which delivers interest payments equal to the official Bank of England base rate. Our results 
are based on 655 values in three of the four tax classes. The starting rate tax class only 
comprises 264 observations because in some years no such tax is raised. Since the higher tax 
class covers a relatively broad range of tax rates in some years, we consistently use the lowest 
rate attributed to this class.19 Panel A in Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics.20 The 
results clearly indicate a major change in February 2009. Before this date, the indifference 
risk coefficients are considerably lower. In years such as 1977, the combination of a Premium 
Bond interest rate slightly exceeding the BoE rate and the advantage that prizes are tax-free 
                                            
19
 In unreported results, we also analyse the top tax rates. In some cases rather extreme risk coefficients occur but 
our conclusions are similar. 
20
 In some empirical studies on individual risk preferences, a popular approximation developed by Pratt (1964) is 
used to calculate the risk coefficients. We take the opportunity to compare our iteratively computed results with 
this approximation. In total, we conclude that Pratt’s approximation and our method produce quite different 
values for the Premium Bond sample. Detailed results are available on request. 
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increases the expected utility to such a degree that a risk-averse investor with a CARA -
 
< 
0.017 would prefer the risk-carrying Premium Bond. Generally, for higher income taxpayers, 
an investment in the lottery bond becomes a lot easier attractive in terms of risk tolerance. 
The lower the individual taxation of an investor, the less risk-averse or more risk-seeking she 
needs to be. We further observe that between 1993 and 2008 volatility decreases and the trend 
goes towards risk neutrality due to a better controlled and thus relatively constant margin of 
interest. As a result, higher rate income taxpayers are still allowed to be risk-averse, however 
closed to risk neutrality. Although all the other taxpayers require some risk-seeking traits, the 
values of the CARA - are
 
surprisingly close to risk neutrality during this time. Commencing 
in February 2009, the BoE base rate rapidly falls below the interest rate of the Premium Bond. 
Finally from October 2009 till December 2011, the BoE base rate is one third of the 1.50% 
interest rate paid by the Premium Bond. These circumstances cause that the lottery bond 
becomes attractive even to quite risk-averse investors. The CARA - of a higher rate taxpayer 
is, for instance, about 0.199 between January 2010 and December 2011.  
Figure 4.2 presents the time series obtained from the CRRA analysis. Note that personal 
wealth is not included. The CRRA - coefficients are scattered from -0.10862 to 0.13360. The 
calculation shows that over time, the risk coefficients changes frequently depending on the 
interest spread between the Premium Bond and the Bank of England rate. While volatility is 
great until the mid-1990’s, it steadily decreases until the sharp increase by the beginning of 
2009. In general, the risk coefficients of the separate tax classes follow the same pattern. 
Before 2009, the Premium Bond interest rate has been adjusted regularly and kept on a fair 
level compared to the official base rate, which results in risk coefficients relatively closed to 
zero. As of December 2011, the parameter values of - lay between 0.09483 and 0.13360. 
After this first examination, we now compare the results with a product which can be actually 
purchased – the NS&I Income Bond. Due to the aforementioned shortened data record, there 
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are no conclusions possible before 1982. The summary statistics are reported in Panel B of 
Table 4.2. The CARA risk coefficients vary between –0.00002 and 0.06382. In terms of 
relative risk aversion, we observe values between -0.07845 and 0.07862. Before 2009, the 
level of risk tolerance for high income taxpayers tends towards risk neutrality. On the other 
hand, the required degree of risk loving for basic and starting rate taxpayers also decreases in 
favour of investing in Premium Bonds. In general, both indifference lines converge more and 
more to the risk neutrality level. Similar to the results based on the BoE base rate, the recent 
adjustments of the interest rates cause considerable changes of the risk coefficients. Now even 
a tax-exempt investor may exhibit risk aversion. Comparing our results, we find that based on 
the Income Bond as an alternative investment one needs to be somewhat less risk-averse or a 
bit more risk-seeking in order to prefer the Premium Bond than based on the BoE base rate. 
The mean CRRA coefficient for higher rate taxpayers with the Income Bond as reference is 
0.01536, the corresponding value with the BoE rate as reference amounts to 0.02240.  
4.3.4. Inclusion of personal wealth and higher investment amounts 
We now extend our initial calculations by assuming that an investor possesses additional 
wealth. As mentioned before, the current average amount invested in Premium Bonds is about 
£1,600. Thus, we now calculate the CRRA indifference risk coefficients with a £1,600 
deposit. Since we lack detailed historic data, we compute equivalent values by adjusting this 
average deposit with the respective retail price index (RPI) for each month. The basis for the 
RPI is January 1987.21 Hence, for example, £1,600 in December 2011 is equivalent to £80 in 
June 1957. This method makes sure that the assumed money invested is always consistent 
with the current price level. The situation is similar to the first setting, but we now also take 
                                            
21
 All RPI data are taken from the Office for National Statistics.  
(http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/data-selector.html?cdid=CHAW&dataset=mm23&table-id=2.1) 
downloaded: 6 April 2013 
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into account the utility of additional wealth. As a proxy, we use the personal income per year, 
showing the effects on utility if one had a certain percentage of her yearly income invested. 
For each tax class, we assume a representative amount of wealth. Inferences on that are drawn 
by analysing the income tax allowances and the bands for each tax class. The following 
values are used for our estimation: yearly income of a person who is not liable to tax £3,738, 
for a starting rate taxpayer £8,755, for a basic rate taxpayer £23,695, and finally £65,975 for a 
higher rate taxpayer.22 Again, the income in each tax band is adjusted by the RPI. Panel A in 
Table 4.3 reports the results. We observe, in line with our previous findings, that measured by 
the median all investors except the higher income taxpayers need to be risk loving. The means 
are biased by the time period after 2008 and tend to indicate more risk aversion. The pattern 
of the indifference lines is equivalent to the simple case. However, now the values are 
quantitatively larger. The risk coefficients range from -1.77962 to 3.52642. This indicates 
that, on the one hand, at particular points in time even quite risk-averse savers are indifferent 
between Premium Bonds and a risk-free investment which yields the BoE base rate. On the 
other hand, starting rate and non-taxpayers have to be more risk-loving. Comparing the 
monthly results shows that the higher the tax rates, the higher the risk coefficients are relative 
to the results without wealth and higher investment amounts. In unreported results, we redo 
the analysis based on the Income Bond. As expected, the risk coefficients are not significantly 
different.  
Next, we assume that an investor always keeps the highest possible investment. We still use 
the same time adjusted wealth as before. In the past fifty-four years, the maximum holding 
was increased in five steps. From June 1957 to March 1964, savers were allowed to hold a 
maximum of £500. In April 1964, the limit was increased to £1,000. Two further increases 
followed in April 1980 (to £10,000) and March 1993 (to £20,000). Since May 2003, the 
                                            
22
 For instance, we estimate the personal wealth of a starting rate taxpayer according to the formula: allowance 
(person under 65 years) + mean of tax band (here 0-£2,560) = £7,475 + (£2,560/2) = £8,755 
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maximum holding amount has been £30,000. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.3. 
We find that the distribution of the values is not as broad as in the previous case with a 
relatively small amount invested. The risk tolerance of higher rate taxpayers declines but still 
allows being risk-averse. The remaining taxpayers require a slightly lower degree of risk 
loving. Due to the higher stakes, it is logical that investors have to take on more risks.  
4.3.5. Long-term analysis 
We next extend the examination to time horizons beyond one month. We look at an individual 
who intends to invest a lump sum at a particular point of time for several years. The first 
choice is to buy a risk-free bond with a fixed interest rate depending on the current interest 
rate level. There are no coupon interest payments during the investment period (zero-coupon 
bond). Hence, the investor collects all the interest and compounded interest at maturity. The 
CRRA utility is calculated from this final payment. To simplify matters, we only study the 
case of a non-taxpayer. As a reference for these calculations, we use the yield curve based on 
UK government bonds (gilts).23 Employing this data, we identify the nominal spot rates for 
investments with investment periods between one month and 25 years. Since the yield curve 
records start in this year, we begin with January 1979. We assume that an individual invests 
£1 at the beginning of January 1979. Then we calculate the risk coefficients for three time 
horizons: twenty years with maturity at the beginning of January 1999, ten years with 
maturity in January 1989, and five years with maturity in January 1984. At the end of the 
maturity, the investor gets her principal refunded. For the calculation of the interest payment, 
we use the monthly discrete interest rates calculated from the compounding interest rates of 
the spot curves.  
                                            
23
 Data on UK yield curves are taken from the Bank of England. 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/yieldcurve/index.htm) downloaded: 30 August 2006 
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We construct the following investment strategy for the Premium Bond. The investor buys one 
bond worth £1 at the end of December 1978. This means that she will participate in the prize 
draw for the first time at the beginning of February 1979. Now she either wins a prize or not. 
If she wins, we assume that the prize is invested at the current spot rate exactly for the 
remaining time period till the beginning of 1999, 1989 or 1984. Then, for each prize in each 
draw, we calculate the value including interest at maturity.24 This allows us to compute for 
each month the expected CRRA utility of the Premium Bond at maturity. For consistency 
reasons, the principal is refunded together with the last prize draw. To obtain one single 
indifference risk coefficient, we use the same - in all Premium Bond utility functions and in 
the utility function of the risk-free investment. The indifference value of - is determined by 
iteratively finding the value where the sum of all Premium Bond utilities and the utility of the 
risk-free spot rate investment becomes equal. The results are -0.15719 for the twenty years 
investment period, -0.12815 for the ten years horizon, and -0.12829 for five years. A further 
test with £1,000 wealth and £100 invested results -0.17899 for the twenty years maturity.  
In total, the previous analyses suggest one potential reason why so many Britons invest in 
Premium Bonds. While the overall risk, measured by expected utility theory, is relatively 
small, savers still get a thrill from gambling. Depending on the individual tax rate and the 
current interest rate, even some risk-averse investors may find the lottery bond attractive. 
4.4. Factors influencing net sales 
We next try to identify factors that explain the development of net sales over time. The basis 
for our analysis is monthly data on net sales from October 1969 to December 2011. Before we 
start our quantitative analysis, we would like to point out an unquantifiable but certainly 
                                            
24
 We estimate monthly spot rates using the Svensson-Nelson-Siegel approach (Nelson and Siegel, 1987; 
Svensson, 1994). 
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important factor: The Premium Bond design is straightforward. As a result, it appeals to 
virtually every household. In particular, this includes low-income families (Tufano, 2008).  
4.4.1. Indifference risk coefficients 
We start by examining whether Premium Bond net sales (variable NETSALES) were affected 
by CARA or CRRA coefficients (variables CARA and CRRA) changing over time. We take 
the time series of four indifference risk coefficients to clarify whether they have a short-run or 
long-run influence on net sales. We focus on the basic rate taxpayers representing the largest 
group. The other groups follow roughly the same pattern, gleaning rather similar results. To 
identify causal correlations, we employ Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) allowing us to 
test whether, after controlling for past values of Y (e.g., NETSALES), past values of X (e.g., 
CRRA) help to forecast Y. One of Granger’s crucial assumptions for testing causality is that 
the variables do not follow a distinct trend, implying they must be stationary. Because 
working with non-stationary variables can lead to spurious regressions and inferences, we 
first perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) to 
discover if the data have unit roots attesting non-stationarity. The variable NETSALES is 
stationary across the time period October 1969 till December 2011. The t-statistic amounts to 
-3.913 (p-value: 0.002). Conducting this test on all risk coefficient time series shows that 
these variables are stationary. We thus need not to proceed with first differences, which is a 
common way of dealing with non-stationary time series. If there is only one unit root in a 
variable, differencing once generates a stationary time series. However, by doing that, we can 
only observe the changes in the variables and we lose information included in the levels.  
The Granger causality test works like this. First, we test the null hypothesis that the risk 
coefficient (e.g., CRRA) does not Granger-cause NETSALES. Therefore, we use an 
autoregressive model: 
Unrestricted regression: tttt CRRANETSALESNETSALES εββη +++= −− 12110                   (4.4) 
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Restricted regression:    ttt NETSALESNETSALES εβη ++= −110                                        (4.5)                       
The first regression expresses that NETSALES in t depend on NETSALES in t-1 and on CRRA 
in t-1. The error term 9 has an expected value of zero. The second regression is for the 
significance test. In this equation, the influence of CRRA is set to zero. To make sure that 
there only exists a unidirectional causality, we also test if NETSALES Granger-cause CRRA. 
Thus,  
Unrestricted regression: tttt NETSALESCRRACRRA εββη +++= −− 12110                  (4.6) 
Restricted regression:     ttt CRRACRRA εβη ++= −110                             (4.7) 
Table 4.4 reports the results with one, three and six lagged months. Past values of the risk 
coefficients do not help to forecast net sales. Further tests with extended time horizons yield 
negative results as well. According to our results, in some cases, net sales Granger-cause the 
risk coefficients. However, there is no meaningful explanation for this.  
4.4.2. Analysing the Premium Bond net sales time series 
We continue by simply investigating the striking peaks in Premium Bond net sales. First of 
all, the size of the jackpot seems to be very important. This is in line with theory which 
suggests that people generally overestimate the very low probability of winning the jackpot 
(Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). Interestingly, individuals especially seem to perceive the 
amount of one million as an important psychological threshold. Although NS&I increased the 
size of the jackpot six times before 1994, the introduction of the £1 million jackpot in April 
1994 marks the first boom in net sales and the cornerstone of the tremendous success in the 
following decade. The fact that net sales already jumped in February 1994 suggests that the 
introduction of the £1m jackpot has been pre-announced and many investors made sure to 
participate in the first draw. The second major jump in net sales in May 2003 can be attributed 
to the increase of the maximum holding from £20,000 to £30,000. Apparently, many people 
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grabbed the chance to place additional funds in Premium Bonds. The third peak in net sales 
occurred in August 2005, when NS&I introduced a second million as a jackpot. In December 
2006 and June 2007, six extra £1 million prizes were given away in two special draws. Each 
draw attracted a massive amount of net sales. Apparently, not only the size of the jackpot is 
relevant but also the number. Interestingly, individuals obviously do not consider the 
purchasing power of the prizes. The nominal £1 million of June 2007 was worth £1.43 million 
expressed in April 1994 pounds. This means that the actual purchasing power of the prize 
declined substantially since then. One may think that this would make the first prize less 
attractive, but the facts prove otherwise. So at first glance, it seems that the size and the 
number of first prizes as well as the maximum individual holding cap play a significant role. 
We will further analyse these determinants in section 4.5. 
4.4.3. Interest rate 
We next test an obvious determinant like the Premium Bond interest rate. We use two 
different time series, the absolute interest rate and the relative interest rate compared to the 
NS&I Income Bond introduced in section 4.3.1. We again perform Granger tests. The sample 
periods are October 1969 till December 2011 for the absolute interest rate and July 1982 till 
December 2011 for the relative interest rate. Both variables are non-stationary, so we use first 
differences. For consistency reasons, we also use first differences of net sales. The results 
using multiple lag lengths suggest that the absolute and relative interest rates of the Premium 
Bond do not Granger-cause net sales. Interestingly, although our tests cannot prove a direct 
statistical relation, recent developments suggest that Premium Bond holders are, to some 
degree, interest-sensitive. Between October 1969 and January 2009, the BoE base rate 
averaged 8.52% while the Premium Bond interest rate averaged only 5.25%. In 463 out of 
472 months, the BoE base rate exceeded the Premium Bond interest rate. Apparently, when 
the reference rate is sufficiently high, holders are willing to forgo a certain part of risk-free 
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interest in order to participate in the lottery. This attitude obviously changes when the 
reference rate, and as a consequence the Premium Bond interest rate, becomes too low. Since 
April 2009, the BoE base rate has been 0.50%. Although the Premium Bond interest rate only 
fell to 1% and a new £25 prize was introduced, bond holders began to withdraw funds. NS&I 
eventually reacted in October 2009 and increased the Premium Bond interest rate to 1.5%. As 
a result, net sales instantly returned to the positive range. The way bond holders obviously do 
and do not accept certain interest rates supports Tufano (2008) who finds that Premium Bonds 
have both savings and gambling elements. 
4.4.4. Macroeconomic variables 
We discussed the potential influence of macroeconomic variables with experts of NS&I. 
Therefore, we compare, among others, the development of the FTSE100 and the UK 
unemployment rate with Premium Bond net sales. In no case Granger causality tests can 
prove a clear statistical link. 
4.4.5. Cumulative prospect theory 
Premium Bond holders seem to overweight the probability of winning the jackpot. This 
anomaly from the expected utility theory suggests that cumulative prospect theory (CPT) 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) may possibly explain the success story of the product. One of 
the main assumptions is that individuals use an inverse s-shaped weighting function to 
transform objective probabilities. As a result, extreme outcomes are overvalued. We calculate 
the CPT valuation for each draw from October 1969 to December 2011 using the original 
model constructed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In the following, we briefly introduce 
the model.  
Consider a gamble with : +  + 1 monetary outcomes ,; < ⋯ < ,> = 0 < ⋯ ,?. The 
corresponding probabilities of occurrence are @;, … , @?. Therefore the prospect  is defined 
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by  = (,, @), −: ≤  ≤ . Investors evaluate the contribution of gains and losses to their 
subjective utility differently, which leads to the following definition:  
B() = B(") + B(),                                                   (4.8) 
where 
B(") = ∑ D"E(,)?F> , B() = ∑ DE(,)>F; .                             (4.9) 
The expression B(") measures the subjective utility of gains. B() measures the subjective 
utility of losses, respectively. 
The decision weights for gains D"(") = (D>", … , D?") and losses D() = (D; , … , D>)  
are defined by: 
D?" = "(@?),   D; = (@;),                                     (4.10) 
D" = "(@ + ⋯ + @?) − "(@" + ⋯ + @?), 0 ≤  ≤  − 1,               (4.11) 
D = (@; + ⋯ + @) − (@; + ⋯ + @), 1 − : ≤  ≤ 0,           (4.12) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) use the following probability weighting functions    
"(@) = &G(&G"(&)G)H/G ,     (@) = &
J
(&J"(&)J)H/J,                         (4.13) 
satisfying "(0) = (0) = 0 and "(1) = (1) = 1. 
They further propose the strictly increasing value function 
E(,) = K ,∝   , ≥ 0,−N(−,)(   , < 0,                                               (4.14) 
satisfying E(,>) = E(0) = 0. The parameter N is the loss-aversion coefficient. By conducting 
experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate the following parameters - = . =
0.88, N = 2.25, P = 0.61, Q = 0.69. We use the same parameters for our analysis. To 
exclusively measure the influence of the prize structure, we assume that the alternative 
investment offers exactly the same interest rate as the Premium Bond. Therefore, the 
monetary outcomes are the respective Premium Bond prizes minus the foregone interest 
payment of the alternative investment. Any valuation B() > 0 indicates that an investor with 
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the given set of individual preferences would prefer holding the Premium Bond rather than 
the alternative investment. 
The CPT valuations over the time period October 1969 to December 2011 range from 0.131 
to 0.541 and average 0.348, assuming that an investor holds one Premium Bond (£1). Despite 
the fact that the Premium Bond is obviously considered more attractive than the alternative 
investment at any time, Figure 4.3 suggests that CPT has difficulties to explain the impressive 
increase in net sales. The negative correlation (ρ = -0.263, t-statistic = -6.132) contradicts the 
hypothesis that more and more savers decided in favour of the Premium Bond because they 
gained attractiveness in terms of valuation based on CPT. Granger causality tests using first 
differences and lag lengths of 1, 3, and 6 months indicate that past changes in CPT valuation 
do not generally help to forecast changes in net sales. The f-statistics amount to 0.405 (lag 1), 
1.544 (lag 3), and 0.105 (lag 6). 
4.4.6. Prize skewness 
Previous research on lottery design and gambling argues that the higher moments of the prize 
distribution are relevant. In unreported tests, we analyse the influence of the prize distribution 
variance, however we cannot prove the frequently discussed importance (Walker and Young, 
2001). The time series show that with the introduction of the £1 million jackpot, the prize 
variance rose dramatically. In spite of the continuous decline in the following years, net sales 
expanded rapidly.  
Literature also argues that individuals find strongly asymmetric payoffs appealing. Hence, the 
third moment of the prize distribution is also often considered crucial (e.g., Golec and 
Tamarkin, 1998; Garrett and Sobel, 1999). Therefore, we test in particular the prize skewness 
as a factor favouring the decision to purchase and hold Premium Bonds. In the first prize draw 
in June 1957, NS&I gave away prizes between £25 (19,590 times) and £1,000 (96 times). In 
the last fifty-four years, the distribution of prizes has been adjusted from time to time 
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resulting in a change of the prize skewness. For example, NS&I raffled 1,721,067 times £25 
and one £1 million in the prize draw in December 2011. This design follows what behavioural 
theory stipulates: a lottery should offer a large number of small prizes to reduce holder’s 
fatigue from the low likelihood of winning. On the other hand, it should also offer a small 
number of very large prizes (creating skewness) to keep the thrill (Shapira and Venezia, 1992) 
and allow individuals to dream (e.g., Forrest et al., 2002). The variable SKEWNESS is derived 
by 
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SKEWNESS                        (4.15) 
where pi,t is the probability of winning a prize of class i in the month t, n is the total number of 
prize classes, xi is the value of the prize in class i and ,̅ is the expected prize. Figure 4.4 
shows the time series of SKEWNESS and NETSALES from October 1969 to December 2011. 
The pattern suggests that SKEWNESS is positively correlated with NETSALES in the long-
run. The correlation coefficient ρ is 0.494 and significant at the 1% level. 
In the short-run, there are obviously exceptions from this correlation. However, if we utilize 
rolling averages in order to smooth out spikes, the correlation becomes stronger. The 
correlation coefficient ρ based on six, twelve and twenty-four months is 0.672, 0.748, and 
0.847. Each is significant at the 1% level. To test for causality, we apply the Granger test once 
more. As already mentioned, the variables must not have a unit root. The ADF test on the 
variable SKEWNESS produces a t-statistic of -0.641 (p-value: 0.991), indicating one unit root. 
We rule out the presence of a second unit root and hence continue with first differences. Table 
4.5 reports the results of the Granger test with several lag lengths. Besides the results of the 
test using a 4 months lag, changes in skewness do not directly Granger-cause net sales. It 
seems reasonable that small changes in the distribution of prizes, only causing marginal 
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changes in skewness, have no direct effects on net sales because investors do not recognise 
them. Big jumps, related with the introduction of a very high prize, for instance, are salient 
enough to be publicly recognised. Additionally, these events are usually accompanied by 
considerable marketing effort. It rather seems that the overall skewness level is more 
important than discrete changes. To further investigate the assumed long-term relationship, 
we perform a simple univariate regression analysis. Since only the variable SKEWNESS is a 
non-stationary time series, OLS is valid. The dependent variable is NETSALES, the 
independent variable SKEWNESS. The regression includes 507 monthly observations from 
October 1969 till December 2011. The coefficient of SKEWNESS is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. The Newey and West (1987) t-statistic amounts to 12.77 (p-value: 0.00) and the 
adjusted R-squared of the model is 0.244.  
Although our results suggest that net sales increase with prize skewness, this does not hold 
true each time the number of jackpots was increased. In this case, skewness dropped but it 
still led to peaks in net sales in the month of the introduction and to increased net sales in the 
following months. We will further investigate this fact in the next section. 
4.5. Regression analysis 
In the following section, we construct regression models building on previous results. We 
analyse the NS&I provided and supplemented data covering the time period October 1969 to 
December 2011. The dependent variable is net sales (NETSALES). Note that this variable 
measures two investor decisions at the same time. The first one is the decision to buy new or 
additional bonds. The second one is to sell them. Considering these two different kinds of 
decisions, net sales is well-suited to analyse especially the influence of prize skewness. 
According to theory, numerous small prizes are supposed to prevent savers from selling. A 
very large jackpot has the same effect, but also motivates savers to buy the bond. Therefore, 
the skewness of the prize distribution should thus have positive effects on net sales.  
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Our previous analysis supports the assumption that besides the skewness of the prizes, the 
maximum holding is a factor influencing net sales. We denote the two variables SKEWNESS 
and MAXINVEST. As the traditional risk coefficients proved inessential, we exclude them. 
Due to multicollinearity, we exclude a manifest factor like the value of the first prize. Since 
skewness is calculated from this figure, the regression would be biased. As discussed before, 
although investors actually seem to prefer skewed prizes, this general statement proves to be 
incorrect for changes in the number of the jackpots. To model this phenomenon, we construct 
a variable denoted NUMJACKPOTS, which is equal to the total number of monthly first 
prizes. The other previously tested factors do not seem to have decisive influence and, 
furthermore, as tests show, do not improve the quality of the regression models. We therefore 
restrict our regressions to the three most salient influencing factors. A detailed analysis of the 
peaks in the time series suggests that Premium Bond investors strongly react to changes in 
major attributes of the program. One reason may be that changes are broadly published by 
NS&I and attract substantial media attention. We take account of this behaviour by using first 
differences of the variables MAXINVEST and NUMJACKPOTS.  
Net sales have been relatively steady until the end of 1993. When NS&I introduced the  
£1 million top prize, investor demand considerably changed. Consequently, the parameters of 
the model changed as well. In the following, we split the sample period. The first period 
ranges from October 1969 to September 1993, shortly before the introduction of the £1 
million top prize. The second period covers October 1993 to April 2006, which marks the end 
of the NS&I provided data. The third period analyses the approximated data on NETSALES 
and runs from May 2006 till December 2011.  
4.5.1. Period 1: October 1969 to September 1993 
We start with the first period and perform ADF tests. The results indicate that NETSALES and 
SKEWNESS are non-stationary (p-values: 0.989 and 0.496). We therefore estimate a 
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regression with first differences (D(...)) of these variables. To control for serial correlations, 
we use autoregressive processes. An autoregressive model of order p is denoted by AR(p) 
expressed by the following equation: 
t
p
i
itit yy εαη ++= ∑
=
−
1
                                                (4.16) 
According to the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, an AR(3) model fits best. We 
again use the Newey and West (1987) method for heteroscedasticity consistent errors and 
covariance in order to minimize the problem of heteroscedasticity. The results are reported in 
Table 4.6. The model, denoted “Period 1”, includes 284 monthly observations. The adjusted 
R-squared is 0.249. The coefficient of D(SKEWNESS) is not significant (p-value: 0.906). This 
is in line with the Granger causality tests in the previous section suggesting that there is no 
short-term relationship between net sales and skewness. As discussed before, we suppose that 
savers do not perceive small changes in skewness and rather find the total distribution 
attractive. The variable D(NUMJACKPOTS) is not significant, too. This is reasonable because 
in this period, the number of first prizes was set to one most of the time. Before August 1971, 
four and five first prizes were alternately given away. Since the value was only £25.000, these 
changes apparently were too insignificant to affect net sales. With respect to the maximum 
holding, we find that this variable does influence net sales. D(MAXINVEST) has a significant 
coefficient with a positive sign. The first increase of the maximum holding cap from £1.000 
to £10.000, and the second one to £20.000 clearly caused increases in net sales.  
4.5.2. Period 2: October 1993 to April 2006 
We repeat the previous steps and construct another regression model for the time period 
October 1993 to April 2006 after demand began to shoot up. We denote the model “Period 2”. 
The ADF tests indicate that NETSALES and SKEWNESS are now stationary (p-values: 0.019 
and 0.036), which eliminates the need to use first differences. Several tests suggest that an 
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AR(1) model fits best. We again use robust standard errors in order to control for 
heteroscedasticity. Table 4.6 shows that all variables have a positive sign and are significant 
at the 1%-level. Although the model looks fairly simple, according to adjusted R-squared, it 
can still explain 75.7% of the variance. The results suggest that net sales are positively 
influenced by prize skewness. They are also affected by changes in the maximum holding and 
changes in the number of the top prizes. We additionally find that obviously most investors 
did not anticipate these changes. Net sales peaked in the month the change occurred, which 
means that these newly bought Premium Bonds did not participate in the draw. 
4.5.3. Period 3: May 2006 to December 2011 
As mentioned at the beginning, we have NS&I provided data available until April 2006. 
However, in the five years after April 2006, the Premium Bond experienced some very 
interesting developments. There have been two anniversary specials draws each raffling five 
times £1 million. Additionally, NS&I introduced a new £25 prize class in April 2009 and 
reduced the number first prizes from two to one. These events caused considerable changes in 
the variables SKEWNESS and NUMJACKPOTS. As described in section 4.3.2, we 
approximate monthly net sales in order to cover this interesting time period. The dependent 
variable NETSALES is stationary (ADF p-value: 0.00) in this time period. We again include 
the variable SKEWNESS. D(NUMJACKPOTS) is supposed to capture the effects of the two 
special draws. Interestingly, we find that now investors did anticipate these events. As NS&I 
promoted the 50th anniversary of Premium Bonds with a major TV advertising campaign, 
investors were well-informed about the forthcoming special draws. We take this fact into 
account by considering a two-month lead. The variable is denoted D(NUMJACKPOTS(t+2)). 
It is not clear, unfortunately, if savers did or did not anticipate the cut of the second £1 million 
top prize in April 2009. We therefore prefer a parsimonious model and stick to only one 
variable. Unlike in the previous two periods there was no change of the maximum holding. 
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We thus exclude D(MAXINVEST). We choose an AR(3) model and again use robust standard 
errors. Table 4.6 presents results (denoted “Period 3”) estimated based on 68 monthly 
observations. The adjusted R-squared amounts to 0.449 and is significantly lower than in the 
second model. The signs of the two explanatory variables are positive and significant at levels 
of 1%. So the results again indicate that net sales are influenced by the skewness of the prize 
distribution and the number of first prizes. We note that in unreported results, we test vector 
autoregressive regressions (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC) models.25 We obtain no 
better results than using the autoregressive models presented above. 
4.5.4. Forecast tests 
In a last step, in-sample forecast tests should help us uncover how well the models work. 
Since we need all the observations for appropriate parameter estimation, we cannot perform 
out-of-sample forecast tests. There are two different kinds of in-sample forecasts: static and 
dynamic forecasts. The static forecast is a sequence of one-step-ahead forecasts. Each month 
the actual value of the lagged dependent variable is used for the autoregressive term. In the 
dynamic procedure, the forecasted lagged dependent variables determine the current forecast. 
The estimations thus become inaccurate the longer the forecasting sample. We evaluate the 
forecasting accuracy of each model based on the respective time period used for training. 
Table 4.7 performs in-sample static and dynamic forecasts for each model. The Theil 
inequality coefficients, especially of the first two models, are relatively close to zero 
indicating quite accurate forecasts of next month’s net sales. Interestingly, the model of the 
third period performs considerably worse. One reason may be that the first anniversary special 
draw in December 2006 attracted much more funds than the model predicted. The dynamic 
                                            
25
 Prize skewness is no entirely exogenous variable. High net sales increase the total number of prizes. Since the 
number of top prizes is usually fixed, the additional prizes are distributed into the remaining classes. As a result, 
prizes are slightly more skewed. 
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forecasts are, as expected, less accurate than the static forecasts. The model of “Period 2” 
(October 1993 to April 2006) generates the best forecasts. Generally, we conclude that while 
the static forecasts work quite well especially until 2006, dynamic forecasts provide only a 
rough estimation. The autoregressive process utilises information contained in net sales and 
considerably increases model accuracy. This fact suggests that besides the tested variables, 
Premium Bond net sales depend on a broad variety of further factors. One very important but 
unquantifiable aspect certainly is the popularity and the mainstream fame the Premium Bonds 
have gained over the past five decades.  
4.6. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to conduct an empirical analysis of the British Premium Bond. 
What prompts so many investors to buy and hold a lottery bond with overall risky payouts? In 
the first step, we calculate the CARA and CRRA risk coefficients at which a saver is 
indifferent between the Premium Bond and a risk-free investment. A central issue is the 
discrimination of the different tax classes. Premium Bond prizes are tax-free, making them 
more or less attractive for certain taxpayers. Basically, we find that the indifference risk 
coefficients are surprisingly close to risk neutrality and the Premium Bond turns out to be not 
especially risky using conventional measures. To search for factors that influence net sales, 
we conduct Granger causality tests. Interestingly, CARA and CRRA risk coefficients have no 
statistical influence on net sales. We also find that cumulative prospect theory rather explains 
single peaks in sales than the overall increase. We show that in the short-run, only major 
changes of prize skewness, such as the introduction of a new first prize, encourage net sales. 
However, there is evidence of long-run relationships. Using multivariate autoregressive 
models, we confirm the influence of skewness on net sales. We additionally establish that 
changes in the maximum holding cap led to jumps in net sales. Our analysis also reveals that 
not only the size of the jackpot affects net sales, but also the number. This is true although 
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skewness declines. A strong plus of accuracy originating from the autoregressive processes 
suggests that Premium Bond net sales additionally depend on factors such as marketing and 
popularity. Future research could try to confirm our results on the importance of the prize 
structure based on a quite similar lottery-linked deposit account with a long data record, the 
Irish Prize Bonds. By the end of 2007, the Prize Bond Company introduced a new prize 
structure and the monthly jackpot increased to €1 million. In the Annual Report 2007 (p. 3) 
they state: “The change was generally welcomed and resulted in greatly increased sales 
during the last quarter of 2007.” 
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Table 4.1: Number and value of prizes awarded in December 2011. 
This table illustrates the details of the December 2011 prize draw as an example.  
  
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Premium Bond compared to alternative investments. 
The table reports results of iteratively determined constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) indifference risk coefficients α. The hand-collected data comprise 655 monthly prize draws from the first draw in 
June 1957 through December 2011. The invested amount is £1. The reference investments are the Bank of England base rate 
(Panel A) and the NS&I Income Bond (Panel B). The analysis distinguishes between four income tax bands: no tax, starting 
rate, basic rate, and higher rate. Positive (negative) values of α indicate risk aversion (risk seeking) across time. A zero value 
means risk neutrality. Savers who are less risk-averse or more risk-seeking than the indifference level will choose the 
Premium Bond since this maximises their utility. 
  
  
Prize £ 25 50 100 500 1,000 5,000 10,000 25,000 50,000 100,000 1,000,000
Number 1,721,067 31,544 31,544 3,216 1,072 89 45 17 10 4 1
Total prize fund value Number of prizes Interest rate p.a.
£ 53,658,25 1.50%
Lower value 89% Medium value 5% Higher value 6% of prize fund
1,788,609
α Mean Median StdDev Maximum Minimum N
Panel A: Bank of England base rate as alternative investment
CARA (no tax) 0.00409 -0.00002 0.01835 0.08979 -0.00070 655
CARA (starting rate) 0.01211 0.00000 0.03191 0.10295 -0.00005 264
CARA (basic rate) 0.00742 0.00000 0.02446 0.11883 -0.00018 655
CARA (higher rate) 0.01296 0.00156 0.03397 0.16401 -0.00011 655
CRRA (no tax) -0.03337 -0.03729 0.03777 0.09483 -0.10862 655
CRRA (starting rate) -0.00416 -0.02048 0.04275 0.10308 -0.06895 264
CRRA (basic rate) 0.00279 -0.00160 0.03622 0.11215 -0.07120 655
CRRA (higher rate) 0.02240 0.01789 0.03715 0.13360 -0.05553 655
Panel B: NS&I Income Bond as alternative investment
CARA (no tax) 0.00013 0.00000 0.00153 0.01766 -0.00002 354
CARA (starting rate) 0.00054 0.00000 0.00277 0.02602 -0.00002 240
CARA (basic rate) 0.00085 0.00000 0.00372 0.03608 -0.00002 354
CARA (higher rate) 0.00446 0.00180 0.00891 0.06382 -0.00001 354
CRRA (no tax) -0.03412 -0.03237 0.01807 0.03621 -0.07845 354
CRRA (starting rate) -0.01132 -0.01466 0.01350 0.04525 -0.03947 240
CRRA (basic rate) -0.00682 -0.00548 0.01519 0.05517 -0.04678 354
CRRA (higher rate) 0.01536 0.01621 0.01605 0.07862 -0.02308 354
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Table 4.3: Premium Bond compared to Bank of England base rate with inclusion of personal wealth and higher 
investment amounts. 
The table reports results of iteratively determined constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) indifference risk coefficients. The 
hand-collected data comprise 655 monthly prize draws from the first draw in June 1957 through December 2011. The 
invested amount is £1,600 (Panel A) and the maximum holding of £30,000 (Panel B). The analysis distinguishes between 
four income tax bands: no tax, starting rate, basic rate, and higher rate. For each tax class, a representative amount of wealth 
is assumed: yearly income of a person who is not liable to tax £3,738, for a starting rate taxpayer £8,755, for a basic rate 
taxpayer £23,695, and finally £65,975 for a higher rate taxpayer. All values are adjusted by the respective retail price index 
(RPI) for each month. The reference investment is the Bank of England base. Positive (negative) values indicate risk aversion 
(risk seeking) across time. A zero value means risk neutrality. Savers who are less risk-averse or more risk-seeking than the 
indifference level will choose the Premium Bond since this maximises their utility.  
  
 
 
Table 4.4: Granger causality tests of net sales and risk coefficients. 
This table reports results of Granger causality tests between the CARA/CRRA indifference risk coefficients and Premium 
Bond net sales. The time period is October 1969 till December 2011. CARA denotes the indifference risk coefficients 
according to the constant absolute risk aversion. CRRA stands for constant relative risk aversion. The analysis distinguishes 
between two income tax bands (basic rate and higher rate). It considers a £1 investment without any further wealth as well as 
a £1,600 investment with £23,695 (basic rate tax) / £65,975 (higher rate tax) of wealth. The reference investment is the Bank 
of England base rate. The table reports results for lag lengths of 1, 3, and 6 months. ***,**,* values are significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10%. 
  
  
α Mean Median StdDev Maximum Minimum N
Panel A: Amount of £1,600 invested
CRRA (no tax) -0.07947 -0.10485 0.17587 0.61068 -1.77962 655
CRRA (starting rate) 0.06475 -0.07925 0.36584 1.07497 -0.18555 264
CRRA (basic rate) 0.13386 -0.00851 0.52428 2.39818 -0.29011 655
CRRA (higher rate) 0.48586 0.18884 0.84581 3.52642 -0.33669 655
Panel B: Maximum holding invested
CRRA (no tax) -0.05072 -0.06036 0.07744 0.23639 -0.67815 655
CRRA (starting rate) 0.00582 -0.03987 0.11883 0.32179 -0.10785 264
CRRA (basic rate) 0.02198 -0.00382 0.12272 0.48740 -0.14530 655
CRRA (higher rate) 0.11093 0.05843 0.21035 0.94356 -0.15188 655
X Lag length F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
CARA basic tax 1 0.0007 0.9795 3.1070 0.0786*
(£1 invested) 3 0.5691 0.6356 0.8781 0.4523
6 1.1981 0.3058 4.5981 0.0001***
CRRA basic tax 1 0.0945 0.7587 0.0275 0.8683
(£1 invested) 3 0.1470 0.9316 0.3506 0.7887
6 0.3679 0.8993 0.5061 0.8039
CRRA basic tax with wealth 1 0.0039 0.9504 1.5022 0.2209
(£1,600 invested) 3 0.2873 0.8346 0.3305 0.8033
6 0.9911 0.4305 2.4009 0.0269**
CRRA higher tax with wealth 1 0.0015 0.9690 2.1054 0.1474
(£1,600 invested) 3 0.1736 0.9142 1.0177 0.3844
6 1.4289 0.2016 1.5594 0.1571
H0: X does not cause NETSALES H0: NETSALES does not cause X 
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Table 4.5: Granger causality tests of net sales and skewness. 
This table reports results of Granger causality tests between Premium Bond net sales and prize skewness. The time period is 
October 1969 till December 2011. The analysis reports results for lag lengths between 1 and 6 months. 
***,**,* values are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
  
 
 
Table 4.6: Multivariate autoregressive models. 
This table presents multivariate autoregressive models, divided into three time periods. The dependent variables are 
NETSALES and D(NETSALES). AR(p) is an autoregressive process of order p. The independent variables are prize skewness 
(SKEWNESS), its first difference D(SKEWNESS), the first difference of the maximum holding D(MAXINVEST), and the first 
difference of the number of jackpots D(NUMJACKPOTS). The variable D(NUMJACKPOTS(t+2)) considers a two-month 
lead. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using Newey-West (heteroscedasticity-adjusted) standard errors. 
***,**,* values are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Lag length F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
1 1.9157 0.1669 51.4854 0.00***
2 0.7968 0.4514 80.7810 0.00***
3 2.0115 0.1114 53.8222 0.00***
4 8.7712 0.00*** 42.6541 0.00***
5 1.5644 0.1685 33.4114 0.00***
6 0.4577 0.8395 25.2407 0.00***
H0: D(SKEWNESS) does not 
cause D(NETSALES)
H0: D(NETSALES) does not 
cause D(SKEWNESS) 
Model Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Oct-69 to Sep-93 Oct-93 to Apr-06 May-06 to Dec-11
Dependent variable D(NETSALES) NETSALES NETSALES
SKEWNESS 272,957*** 177,996***
(7.902) (2.964)
D(SKEWNESS) 1,930.0
(0.181)
D(MAXINVEST) 1,421*** 51,135***
(3.627) (10.451)
D(NUMJACKPOTS) 289,115 233,226,206***
(1.124) (7.163)
D(NUMJACKPOTS(t+2)) 233,158,323***
(5.377)
AR(1) -0.295*** 0.782*** 0.718***
(-4.806) (13.488) (5.605)
AR(2) -0.360*** -0.402***
(-2.746) (-2.717)
AR(3) -0.293*** 0.254*
(-2.493) (1.714)
Durbin-Watson stat 1.99 2.17 1.98
Adj. R-squared 0.251 0.757 0.499
N 284 151 68
111 
 
Table 4.7: Forecast accuracy. 
This table analyses the forecast accuracy of the multivariate autoregressive models introduced in Table 4.6. The analysis is 
divided into three time periods Period 1: October 1969 to September 1993, Period 2: October 1993 to April 2006, and Period 
3: May 2006 to December 2011. The table performs two different kinds of in-sample forecasts: static and dynamic forecasts. 
The static forecast is a sequence of one-step-ahead forecasts. Each month the actual value of the lagged dependent variable is 
used for the autoregressive term. In the dynamic procedure, the forecasted lagged dependent variables determine the current 
forecast. 
  
 
  
Model Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Oct-69 to Sep-93 Oct-93 to Apr-06 May-06 to Dec-11
Static forecast
Root mean squared error 3,112,928 59,493,050 215,000,000
Mean absolute percent error 53.6 28.3 332.1
Theil inequality coefficient 0.153 0.137 0.349
Dynamic forecast
Root mean squared error 8,366,202 95,246,589 267,000,000
Mean absolute percent error 235.8 48.1 378.1
Theil inequality coefficient 0.352 0.228 0.442
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Figure 4.1: Interest rates of the Premium Bonds compared to the Bank of England base rate and the NS&I Income 
Bond. 
This figure compares the interest rates of the Premium Bonds, the Bank of England (BoE) base rate, and the NS&I Income 
Bond over the time period from June 1957 to December 2011. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Indifference risk coefficients (CRRA) Premium Bond compared to Bank of England base rate. 
This figure tracks the constant relative risk aversion CRRA indifference risk coefficients over the time period June 1957 to 
December 2011. The reference investment is the Bank of England base. The analysis distinguishes between four income tax 
bands: no tax CRRA(0), starting rate CRRA(S), basic rate CRRA(B), and higher rate CRRA(H). Positive (negative) values 
indicate risk aversion (risk seeking) across time. A zero value means risk neutrality. Savers who are less risk-averse or more 
risk-seeking than the indifference level will choose the Premium Bond since this maximises their utility. 
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Figure 4.3: Valuation based on cumulative prospect theory compared with Premium Bond net sales. 
This figure compares Premium Bond net sales and cumulative prospect theory (CPT) valuation over the time period October 
1969 to December 2011. The CPT valuation is based on the theory formalized by Tversky and Kahneman in 1992. The 
analysis uses the originally estimated parameters α = β =  0.88, λ  =  2.25, γ+ = 0.61, and γ- =0.69.   
  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Prizes skewness compared with Premium Bond net sales. 
This figure compares Premium Bond net sales and prize skewness over the time period October 1969 and December 2011. 
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